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ABSTRACT 
 
KANG YANG TREVOR YU: Affective Influences in Person-Environment fit Theory: 
Exploring the Role of Affect as Both Cause and Outcome of P-E fit  
(Under the direction of Jeffrey R. Edwards) 
 
Person-environment (P-E) fit theory is a general framework that has been used 
extensively to understand thinking and behavior in organizations. However, recent research 
has highlighted several important issues that compromise our understanding of the P-E fit 
construct. First, it is widely-assumed that affect is only an outcome of P-E fit. Second, our 
understanding of the antecedents to P-E fit is severely limited. Third, the non-
correspondence between objective and subjective fit components has typically not been 
accounted for. In a bid to address these issues, this paper presents an expanded model of P-
E fit which argues for and explicates a more important role for work-based affect (i.e. 
moods, emotions, and affective attitudes that are experienced at work) in P-E fit theory. 
Two perspectives are presented to account for why work-based affect can be a cause of P-E 
fit. The second part of this project reports on an empirical study that was conducted to 
investigate the causal effect of work-based affect on P-E fit together with other key 
relationships proposed by the expanded theory of P-E fit. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE P-E FIT CONCEPT 
Person-Environment (P-E) fit has typically been defined as the congruence, match, 
or similarity between the person and the environment (Edwards, Caplan & Harrison, 1998; 
Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman & Johnson, 2005). Past research has established the existence 
of several types of fit. These include fit between the demands of the environment and 
abilities of the person (Dawis, 1992; Edwards, 1996), fit between individual needs and 
environmental supplies (Edwards & Harrison, 1993), and fit between organizational values 
and those of the individual (Cable & Judge, 1996; Chatman, 1991; O’Reilly, Chatman & 
Caldwell, 1991). A variety of positive outcomes have been linked to P-E fit, such as job 
satisfaction, organizational commitment, psychological well-being, turnover, job 
performance, and citizenship behaviors (Cable & DeRue, 2002; Kristof, 1996; Kristof, 
Zimmerman & Johnson, 2005; Verquer, Beehr & Wagner, 2003). 
P-E fit theory 
This project revisits person-environment (P-E) fit theory and embellishes it by 
highlighting the largely unexplored role of affect in P-E fit. This paper presents us with an 
improved understanding about P-E fit, particularly about the way that P-E fit judgments are 
made, and about the crucial role that affect plays in these judgments. A brief review of P-E 
fit theory is first presented before the role of affect in it is discussed. 
 As illustrated in figure 1, the traditional P-E fit model typically portrays the person 
(P) and environment (E) as objective and subjective constructs. The objective person 
 
 
  
describes characteristics of the person that actually exist. On the other hand, the subjective 
person refers to the person’s perception of his or her own characteristics and attributes (i.e. 
needs, wants, and values). The objective environment describes physical and social 
conditions that are independent from the person’s perceptions, while the subjective 
environment refers to the nature of situations and contexts that are experienced and 
perceived by people (Caplan, 1987a; Edwards et al., 1998; Kristof, 1996). As illustrated in 
figure 1, P-E fit theory positions objective P and E as causes of their subjective 
counterparts. The strength of these causal relationships are subject to influence from factors 
such as social construction processes (Weick, 1979), perceptual biases and distortion (e.g., 
repression, denial), limited mental capabilities for the processing of information (March & 
Simon, 1958), and organizational structures and boundaries limiting access to objective 
information (Caplan, 1987b; Edwards et al., 1998; Harrison, 1978). 
P-E fit theory highlights several different relationships that occur between 
subjective and objective P and E: First, objective P-E fit denotes fit between the objective 
person and the objective environment, whereas subjective P-E fit refers to the fit between 
the subjective person and subjective environment. As for relationships between objective 
and subjective counterparts, contact with reality describes the degree to which the 
subjective environment corresponds to the objective environment, whereas accuracy of 
self-assessment (also referred to as accessibility of the self; French, Rodgers & Cobb, 
1974), represents correspondence between the objective person and subjective person 
(Edwards et al., 1998). Most contemporary treatments of P-E fit view subjective P-E fit as a 
mediator between objective fit and individual outcomes (Edwards et al., 1998; Kristof, 
1996; Kristof-Brown et al., 2005). This perspective follows from the common 
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understanding that perceptions of reality drive cognitive appraisals of and reactions to 
specific contexts and situations. Hence, subjective perceptions of P and E likely exert a 
stronger influence on individual outcomes like satisfaction and commitment compared to 
objective P and E. Thus, objective fit would only impact individual outcomes if a 
corresponding fit is perceived by individuals (Edwards et al., 1998; Kristof, 1996). 
Issues with P-E fit theory 
Assumption of a unidirectional relationship between fit and affect.  Though 
it has been a popular topic of research in the past few decades, several important issues 
remain unaddressed with P-E fit theory. First, Most theorizing on P-E fit has focused on the 
causal relationship involving P-E fit leading to positive affective outcomes (Chatman, 
1989; Dawis & Lofquist, 1984; Edwards et al., 1998). For instance, O’Reilly et al. (1991) 
argue that the concept of fit is based on the perspective that “positive responses will occur 
when individuals fit or match the requirements of a situation” (p. 489). Ideas such as this 
have invariably led to most empirical studies being framed according to this simplistic but 
widely accepted “fit leading to positive outcomes” paradigm (Kristof et al., 2005). This 
common assumption about the relationship between fit and affect constitutes an important 
issue in P-E fit research because it ignores previous evidence from other research areas that 
document the ability of affect to influence aspects of the objective and subjective person 
and environment. For instance, in his work on job satisfaction, Locke (1984) argues that the 
negative affect stemming from dissatisfaction with one’s job causes people to attempt to 
modify the source of their dissatisfaction by distorting their perceptions of the environment. 
Furthermore, cybernetic theories of stress and coping also argue that the negative affect that 
accompanies perceived discrepancies between the sensed environment and individual 
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attributes stimulates coping that can involve attempts to change person or environment 
attributes. Thus, the completeness of our understanding of person-environment fit is 
compromised if P-E fit research continues to focus only on the unidirectional causal 
relationship leading from fit to affective outcomes like satisfaction. Rather, a more 
comprehensive understanding of the nomological network of P-E fit might be achieved if 
the idea that affect can also cause P-E fit is explicitly considered in P-E fit research. 
 Antecedents of P-E fit. A second important remaining issue with P-E fit is the 
lack of understanding about the individual-level antecedents to P-E fit. While some 
research has focused on how organizational-level human resource policies such as 
recruitment, selection, and socialization can predict fit among newcomers (Chatman, 1991; 
Cable & Parsons, 2001; Kim, Cable & Kim,2005; Kristof-Brown, 2000), little is known 
about individual level variables that may also influence P-E fit. Furthermore, the exact 
nature of the influence of organizational policies on P-E fit has also typically been 
obfuscated by the use of single index measures of fit. These problems stem from a relative 
lack of theory about the factors that influence objective and subjective components of P-E 
fit (Edwards et al., 2006; Kristof-Brown et al., 2005). That is, referring to the general 
model of P-E fit in figure 1, P-E fit theory has typically not incorporated descriptions about 
what predicts objective E and P. Furthermore, aside from their objective counterparts, little 
is known about what other factors that might drive subjective E and P.  
Non-correspondence between objective and subjective fit components Third, P-
E research has also typically assumed that subjective perceptions of person (P) and 
environment (E) are only influenced by objective features of the P and E respectively 
(Caplan, 1987a; 1987b; Kristof, 1996; Kristof-Brown et al., 2005). As a result, most 
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empirical research treats any non-correspondence between objective and subjective P and E 
as error or methodological nuisance. This ignores a vast amount past research which 
suggest that subjective perceptions of both the environment and the self can be influenced 
by factors such as the social context, cognitive reconstruction, decision-making biases 
(Chapman & Johnson, 1999; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; 
Weick, 1979), and affective experience (Clore, Schwarz & Conway, 1994). Hence, we are 
left with limited knowledge about how fit judgments are actually made and how situational 
or personal variables can influence such judgments (Billsberry, Ambrosini, Moss-Jones & 
Marsh, 2005).  
Overall, these three issues constitute a significant dearth in our understanding of the 
P-E fit construct. By delineating the role of affect in P-E fit theory, this paper attempts to 
address these issues, and in the process improve our understanding of P-E fit as a 
theoretical and psychological construct.
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
WORK-BASED AFFECT 
Defining work-based affect 
 Affect has typically referred to the moods and emotions that people experience 
(Russell, 1980). In the organizational sciences, affect can also refer to attitudes that contain 
affective components such as job satisfaction (Brief & Weiss, 2002; Cranny, Smith & 
Stone, 1992; Katzell, 1964; Locke, 1969; 1984). This paper therefore adopts the term 
“work-based affect” to refer to moods, emotions, and affective attitudes that are 
experienced at work. Special emphasis is paid to the term “work-based” because this paper 
focuses on the type of affect that is specifically either experienced at the workplace or 
towards work-based targets such as one’s job or organization. Work-based affect is caused 
by factors from both within the workplace and factors that are exogenous to the workplace. 
Exogenous or non work-based factors include individual disposition, namely positive and 
negative affectivity, and also recurring cycles of feelings over time. Work-based causes of 
affect consist of various phenomena that make up an individual’s work experience such as 
stressful events, leaders, work group characteristics, physical settings, and organizational 
rewards and punishments (Brief & Weiss, 2000; p. 287-292).  
Work-based affect and current P-E fit research  
Most theorizing on P-E fit has focused on the causal relationship involving P-E fit 
leading to positive outcomes. While various theoretical explanations may exist for this 
relationship, most of them rely on the key idea that “positive responses will occur when 
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individuals fit or match the requirements of a situation” (Diener, Larsen & Emmons, 1984; 
O’Reilly, Chatman & Caldwell, 1991; p. 489). For instance, the Theory of Work 
Adjustment posits that satisfaction follows from successful adjustments that bring 
individual attributes into correspondence with the environment (Bretz & Judge, 1994 
Dawis & Lofquist, 1984). Many studies based on this generally accepted causal 
relationship have concluded that P-E fit leads to prominent attitudinal outcomes such as job 
satisfaction, organizational commitment, and organizational identification (Kristof, 1996; 
Kristof-Brown et al, 2005). 
Notably, many of these common attitudinal outcomes of fit have significant 
affective components. Past research in their respective areas has argued for or observed the 
presence of affective components in job satisfaction (Brief & Weiss, 2002; Locke, 1984), 
organizational commitment (Allen & Meyer, 1990; 1996), and organizational identification 
(Bergami & Bagozzi, 2000; Harquail, 1998). Hence, these attitudes and their affective 
components may be described along the pleasantness-unpleasantness dimension, which 
underlies the structure of most affective experiences (Burke, Brief, George, Roberson & 
Webster, 1989; Watson & Tellegen, 1985). Pleasantness is usually characterized by 
positive moods such as content, happy, pleased satisfied and warmhearted, while 
unpleasantness is commonly associated with feeling blue, grouchy, sad, sorry, and unhappy 
(Watson & Tellegen, 1985; p.221). Therefore, even though it is seldom mentioned 
explicitly, work-based affect has usually been treated as an important outcome of P-E fit in 
a considerable amount of empirical and theoretical research in P-E fit.
 
 
 
 
 
CHPATER 3 
AN EXPANDED MODEL OF P-E FIT 
 The model presented in this paper integrates work-based affect into P-E fit theory. It 
is argued that the role of work-based affect in P-E fit theory should not just be constrained 
to that of an outcome of fit in the form of affective attitudes. Instead, work-based affect can 
also be a cause of P-E fit. This new expanded model of P-E fit theory is illustrated in figure 
2. As can be seen in figure 2, subjective P-E fit mediates the effects of objective P-E fit on 
work-based affect, which is commonly observed in the form of attitudinal outcomes with 
affective components (e.g. job satisfaction). These relationships are consistent with the 
existing P-E fit theory illustrated in figure 1. Furthermore, work-based affect experienced at 
an earlier time logically influences work-based affect experienced at a later time. This 
relationship is in line with previous findings that affect experienced in the form of moods 
and emotions at an earlier time influenced affective attitudes (e.g. job satisfaction) that 
were assessed at a later time (Brief, Butcher & Roberson, 1995; Weiss, Nicholas & Daus, 
1999). Perhaps most importantly, work-based affect is also represented as an antecedent of 
both objective and subjective forms of person (P) and environment (E). Hence, work-based 
affect influences subjective P and E both directly and indirectly, where its indirect effects 
are mediated by objective P and E. 
Addressing highlighted issues in P-E fit theory 
 This expanded model of P-E fit is particularly useful because it helps us address the 
three issues in P-E fit that were highlighted earlier. First, explicitly incorporating work-
 
 
  
based affect into P-E theory provides theoretical rationale for why and how the person and 
environment components of objective and subjective fit are subject to affective influence.   
In doing so, the role of affect in P-E fit theory is expanded from just an outcome of P-E fit 
to also being a possible cause of P-E fit. Hence, the expanded model of P-E fit’s emphasis 
on affect as both a cause and an outcome of fit, challenges future research to pay more 
attention to the issue of causality between P-E fit and affect.   
Incorporating work-based affect as a cause of P-E fit also deals with the lack of 
knowledge about the antecedents to P-E fit. It is now widely accepted that work-based 
affect influences how people think and behave in organizational situations (Brief, 2001; 
Brief & Weiss; Forgas & George, 2001; George & Jones, 1997).  
By outlining actual processes via which work-based affect impacts the objective and 
subjective components of P-E fit, this model presents theoretical evidence for an important 
individual level antecedent to P-E fit. 
 Last but not least, the current expanded model of P-E fit provides an alternative 
explanation for the non-correspondence between the objective and subjective forms of the 
person (P) and environment (E) by explaining how work-based affect can influence 
subjective perceptions of P and E over and above their objective counterparts. Up to this 
point, P-E fit theory has typically assumed that subjective perceptions of P and E emerge 
from a strictly cognitive process whereby objective P and E are their sole antecedents. This 
assumption is symptomatic of an overly-cognitive view of how judgments are made in 
actual organizational contexts (Brief, 2001). By explicating the role of affect as a cause of 
subjective P and E, the current expanded model provides a more realistic account of 
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nomological network of P-E fit in the potential affective hotbeds  of today’s organizational 
situations. 
Since it constitutes a new development from the traditional P-E fit theory outlined 
in figure 1, the central role that work-based affect plays in the expanded model of P-E fit 
will now be explicated by presenting two perspectives that account for the causal 
relationships leading from work-based affect to P-E fit. The introduction of these two 
perspectives is accompanied by detailed literature reviews of past research that serve as the 
theoretical backbone of these two perspectives. Several general propositions based on the 
expanded model are then put forth to provide directions for further research. Finally, a 
study motivated by several of these propositions is presented.
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
AFFECT AS A CAUSE OF P-E FIT 
An affective-consistency perspective 
 The first perspective presented to account for affective influence on objective and 
subjective components of P-E fit is called affective-consistency. This perspective draws 
from theories of cognitive consistency and affective influence on social judgment. It 
proposes that individuals will adjust the environment (E) and person (P) in ways that are 
consistent with the work-based affect that they experience. Therefore, assuming positive 
affect is consistent with P-E fit, people experiencing positive work-based affect would 
adjust E and P so as to achieve fit between the two. This means that Paul, who is currently 
feeling happy about his job, would be inclined to perceive fit between his need for 
autonomy and the amount of autonomy that is supplied by his job in order to be consistent 
with his positive feelings toward his job. Conversely, since negative affect is associated 
with P-E misfit, people experiencing negative work-based affect would be motivated to 
have misfit between E and P. Thus, if Paul were to feel distressed about his job instead, he 
would be more likely to perceive that the amount of autonomy present in his job does not 
fit with the amount which he needs, so that he has consistency between P-E misfit and his 
negative feelings toward his job.  As reflected in figure 2, work-based affect can influence 
both objective and subjective P-E fit through their respective E and P components. The 
above examples of Paul describe cases where a person cognitively distorts his perceptions 
of subjective E and P to be consistent with work-based affect.  Alternatively, individuals 
 
 
  
may also be motivated to manipulate their objective selves (P) and work environments (E) 
in order to have P-E fit to be consistent with their feelings. For instance, instead of 
cognitively distorting his perceptions of E and/or P, Paul could try to change the amount of 
autonomy that he needs (objective P), or negotiate with his supervisor to change the 
amount of autonomy that is currently in his job (objective E) so that his P-E fit is in line 
with work-based affect. The next section reviews the theory and research that underlies the 
affective consistency perspective.       
Theoretical foundations 
Affective primacy. The experience of affect makes up an essential component of 
individuals’ work experiences (Forgas & George, 2001; George & Jones, 1997). The 
affective nature of work attitudes, moods, and emotions is central to the hypothesized 
causal relationship leading from work-based affect to P-E fit because evidence suggests that 
the experience of affect can precede cognition. According to Zajonc (1980; 1984), “objects 
need to be cognized minimally to arouse affect” (p. 154). It is thus possible that people can 
feel good about something such as a job or organization before they even know precisely 
what it is. Results from a large number of experimental studies indicate that people tend to 
selectively remember their affective reactions to various stimuli. Interestingly, this occurs 
even when they have no recollection of previous encounters with these stimuli, and also 
when they have no memory for the reasons underlying their feelings towards these stimuli 
(Bower & Forgas, 2001; Zajonc, 2000).  Therefore, since judgments of self (P) and 
environment (E) typically require a certain amount of perceptual and cognitive encoding, 
individuals’ experience of work-based affect may precede their judgments of P-E fit. In 
12 
 
  
other words, individual’s experience of affect toward their jobs and organizations could 
precede their subjective experiences of person-job and person-environment fit.   
Cognitive consistency. Another idea that is central to the affective-
consistency perspective is that individuals are motivated to have consistency among 
attributes of the self (e.g. feelings, values, and attitudes) and behavior. Ideas about the 
desirability of cognitive consistency and the motivation to achieve it feature prominently in 
various early social psychological theories such as self-consistency theory (Lecky, 1945; 
1968); balance theory (Heider, 1958), and cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957). 
The basic premise of self-consistency theory is that people’s self concepts consist of an 
organized set of congruent self perceptions integrated into a coherent whole (Lecky, 1968). 
People are motivated to act in ways that are congruent with their understanding of 
themselves in order to maintain self-consistency (Elliot, 1986; p. 207-208). This preference 
for self-consistency is echoed in the organizational sciences by Korman (1970; 1976) who 
argues in his consistency theory of work behavior that individuals seek out behavioral roles 
that allow them to act in ways that are consistent with their self-images. Similarly, balance 
theory also posits that inconsistency among (a) a person’s attitudes toward an object, (b) 
the perceived attitudes of a significant other toward the same object, and (c) the person’s 
relationship with the significant other gives rise to an imbalanced state which engenders 
feelings of “tension” (Insko, 1981). This in turn produces a motivational drive to establish 
balance via either a change of attitude toward the object or a change of attitude toward the 
significant other (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Heider, 1958; Insko, 1981). Lastly, cognitive 
dissonance theory, perhaps the most widely known theory based upon the desirability of 
consistency, posits that incompatibility between cognitive and behavioral elements give 
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rise to a negative affective state for the perceiver. Perceivers are thus motivated to reduce 
this dissonance by engaging in some form of cognitive adjustment such as the changing of 
one’s attitude (Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Festinger, 1957).  
Overall, theories of cognitive consistency suggest that individuals strive to maintain 
consistency among cognitions, feelings, and behaviors. Hence, affective primacy and 
cognitive consistency principles together imply that existing work-based affect, which as 
described above is a product of both organizational (e.g. work stress, leadership, and 
rewards and punishment) and non-organizational (e.g. dispositions, family events) factors, 
can not only be experienced prior to P-E fit, but also that it influences P-E fit through 
individuals’ need to have consistency between affect and P-E fit. Therefore, Paul 
experiences happiness toward his job before he is aware of his P-E fit, and then tries to 
behave and/or think consistently about how well he fits into his environment.  Two 
theoretical accounts that account for specific affective-consistency relationships between 
work-based affect and P-E fit are reviewed in the next section. 
Mood congruency and associative network theory.  The associative network 
theory of affect provides a conceptual framework for understanding the mechanisms that 
link affect and social cognition. This theory assumes that affective experiences can 
influence every step of the information processing sequence, from selective attention to 
certain information, to the encoding of that information, and its subsequent retrieval from 
memory (Bower, 1981; Bower & Forgas, 2001; Isen, Shalker, Clark & Karp, 1978). 
Associative networks depict specific affect and feelings as nodes located within an 
associative network, where beliefs and memories of certain behaviors, objects, situations, 
or events are linked to certain affective nodes.  A node is aroused when a person encounters 
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a situation which elicits an affective response. The activation of the node in turn spreads 
activation to the variety of beliefs and memories to which it is connected within a network 
(Clark & Isen, 1982).  
In the context of social judgments, associative networks explain mood-dependent 
retrieval where individuals would recall events that correspond to their current mood when 
they first encountered it (Bower, 1981). Perhaps more importantly, associative networks 
also explain mood-congruent processing, which occurs when people become selectively 
sensitized to take in and process information that agrees with current experienced affect 
(Bower & Forgas, 2001). Forgas and Bower (1987) demonstrated that people engage in 
deeper processing of mood-congruent information when they had participants read 
descriptions about target characteristics in an impression-formation experiment. They 
found that participants in happy moods spent a longer time reading and learning about 
positive characteristics. Later, these participants also remembered more positive and 
socially desirable traits associated with a target stranger. A parallel observation was made 
for participants in sad moods. These participants spent longer times reading about negative 
characteristics, and remembered more socially undesirable behaviors and traits associated 
with the target stranger. These results show that mood congruent information is subjected 
to more cognitive processing, which can lead to the generation of beliefs that are in line 
with one’s affect. 
With regards to P-E fit, mood congruency has also been specifically linked to both 
self-perceptions and perceptions of work environments. Past research that has demonstrated 
that self-based perceptions can be influenced by affective states and feelings (Forgas, 
Bower & Krantz, 1984; Sedikides, 1995). For example, research on the effects of affect on 
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self-perception indicates that positive affect emphasizes the positivity of self cognitions, 
while negative affect augments the negativity of self cognitions (Sedikides & Green, 2001). 
Similarly, affect has also been shown to influence perceptions of the work environment and 
job tasks in particular (Morgeson & Campion, 1997). Kraiger and colleagues found that 
individuals’ affective states originating from outside the task influenced perceptions of 
their assigned tasks. In their study, participants who were induced with a positive mood 
rated their tasks to be higher in task feedback, skill variety, and task significance (Kraiger, 
Billings & Isen, 1989).  Findings by Adler and colleagues (experiment 1) also suggest that 
cues concerning participants’ task satisfaction can influence subsequent task perceptions. 
Specifically, subjects who were led to believe that they experienced more satisfaction 
towards a particular task proceeded to rate the task to be higher in autonomy, skill variety 
and task identity compared to subjects who believed they were less satisfied with the same 
task. Similar results were obtained when participants undertook the task in groups. 
Participants who believed they were more satisfied with the group task subsequently 
provided more positive ratings of the group atmosphere, physical environment, and other 
characteristics of the task compared to those who thought that they were less satisfied with 
the task (Adler, Skov & Salvemini, 1985).  
 The principles of mood congruency also underlie observations regarding the 
reciprocal relationship between job satisfaction and job perceptions (James & Jones, 1980; 
James & Tetrick, 1986; Mathieu, Hofmann & Farr, 1993). These studies employ mood-
congruency reasoning to explain the ability of work-based affect in the form of job 
satisfaction to cause job perceptions. Specifically, they argue that positive feelings toward 
one’s job can influence perceptions of the work environment by causing the individual to 
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(a) attend selectively to situational cues that serve to maintain or confirm existing levels of 
affect; (b) associate either desirable or undesirable attributes to a job that he or she already 
regards satisfying or dissatisfying;  and (c) cognitively reconstruct contextual cues in order 
to increase the likelihood that they will be consistent with work-based affect (James, Hater, 
Gent & Bruni, 1978; James & Jones, 1980; p. 102-103). Work-based affect thus serves as a 
“cognitive filter” that causes people to perceive their work environments in ways that are 
consistent with experienced levels of satisfaction (James & Sells, 1981). In all, studies 
reviewed in this section indicate that work-based affect can influence self and job-based 
perceptions in a way so that they are consistent with how an individual feels about his or 
her job.   
  Mood-as-information.  Aside from its influence on perceptions of self and the 
environment, experienced affect is also believed to inform individuals about the nature of 
their current psychological status or situation (Frijda, 1988). Specifically, positive affect 
signals that a situation is safe, which in turn implies that there is no threat to current goals, 
and that there is no danger of negative outcomes. In contrast, negative affect informs 
individuals that the current situation is problematic, and of the impending danger of 
negative outcomes (Clore et al., 1994; Schwarz, 1990). This implies that work-based affect 
can also serve to inform individuals about the desirability of their current work situation 
(Schwarz & Clore, 2003; Wyer & Carlston, 1979). This provides another alternative 
explanation for the causal influence of work-based affect on perceptions of the person and 
environment.  
Based on the assumption of the informational value of affective states, the mood-as-
information (MAI) hypothesis posits that individuals form evaluative judgments by using 
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their feelings as information (Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; 2003). In doing so, 
they may misread feelings that were elicited by other causes as affective reactions to the 
object of judgment, resulting in more positive evaluations of the target object in the 
presence of positive rather than negative feelings. So even though Paul’s current felt 
happiness towards his job is due to his recent promotion, in order to be consistent with his 
positive work-based affect, he may also infer that he fits well with his job by thinking that 
his job also satisfies his need for autonomy.  
The MAI theory contrasts from associative network theory by proposing that 
information provided by feelings is only used in evaluative judgments if it is perceived to 
be relevant to the judgment at hand. To test hypotheses from this theory, researchers 
manipulated the perceived informational value of subjects’ affective states in various 
studies (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schwarz, Servay, Kumpf, 1985). For instance, Schwarz 
and Clore (1983) studied the link between moods and evaluative judgment by having 
subjects rate how happy and satisfied they were with their lives either on rainy days or 
sunny days. It was assumed that subjects who were called on rainy days would be in bad 
moods and hence produce lower ratings on happiness and satisfaction compared to those 
who were called on sunny days. To manipulate the informational value that subjects placed 
on their respective moods, some subjects were also induced to attribute their mood to the 
weather by being asked the simple question: “By the way, how’s the weather down there?” 
The intention was to have respondents link their momentary feelings to the weather, so that 
they would discount their current feelings as valid information when evaluating the quality 
of their lives. Results supported the MAI hypothesis by showing that subjects who were 
asked to evaluate their well-being on rainy days, and who were also induced to misattribute 
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their bad mood to the weather, reported being as happy and satisfied as subjects who were 
called on sunny days. In contrast, when the weather was not mentioned, the subjects who 
were called on rainy days reported being less happy and satisfied compared to subjects 
called on sunny days. Therefore, subjects who felt bad but attributed their feelings to an 
irrelevant source like the weather discounted their affective state in evaluating the quality 
of their lives. These findings would have been in contrast to ideas based on associative 
networks and mood-congruency, which would predict that people in bad moods would 
simply recall information that would lead to negative evaluations of well-being vice versa.  
Therefore, the MAI hypothesis suggests that individuals first use their experienced 
work-based affect as information about whether they fit their environments. When Paul 
feels good about his job, he infers that fit also must exist between him (P) and elements of 
his job (E). Conversely, if he feels bad about his job, he would then infer that he does not 
fit with his job.  Hence, instead of embarking on a detailed analysis of the attributes of P 
and E and how well they fit, individuals like Paul use their work-based affect to derive 
respective judgments of P and E and the fitting (or non-fitting) relationship between the 
two. 
Evaluating affective-consistency perspective theories 
 Though they each posit different underlying psychological processes, a common 
theme for both associative network theory and the MAI hypothesis is that perceptions of P 
and E would be biased toward producing P-E fit that is consistent with current levels of 
work-based affect. According to associative network theory, work-based affect primes 
similarly valenced cognitions and memories about the self and the work environment. 
Similarly, the MAI hypothesis posits that unless they are given a reason to discount the 
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validity of their feelings at work as a source of information, individuals consider their 
current level of work-based affect when evaluating P-E fit. While these theories may 
present plausible explanations of why work-based affect should cause P-E fit, there are 
however several limitations to their ability to account for all the relationships presented in 
figure 2.    
Isolated focus on person and environment perceptions. P-E fit relationships 
essentially consist of a three dimensional relationship between component measures of 
person (P) and environment (E) and an outcome like satisfaction (Edwards, 2002; Edwards 
& Parry, 1993). As such, investigations into P-E fit should consider jointly the relationships 
among P, E and a third variable, which is work-based affect in this case. Whereas the above 
theories can account for the influence of work-based affect on atomistic or separate 
judgments of person (P) and environment (E) respectively, little is known about its ability 
to predict affective influences on joint perceptions of P and E which together constitute 
subjective P-E fit. Studies utilizing mood congruency to explain reciprocal relationships 
between work-based affect and job perceptions typically do not explicitly account for the 
effects that person attributes can have on ratings of job perceptions (James & Jones, 1980; 
James & Tetrick, 1986; Mathieu et al., 1993). While these studies assume that individual 
characteristics such as needs, self-concepts, and beliefs are causally linked to job 
perceptions (James & Jones, 1980; p.103), they do not consider individual characteristics 
such as values and needs that are commensurate with the dimensions of work environment 
that are studied. This lack of use of commensurate P and E makes it impossible to study 
fitting relationships between person and environment attributes (Chatman, 1989; Edwards 
et al., 1998). On a similar note, the mood-as-information hypothesis only considers the 
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impact of affect on evaluative judgments of overall well-being. In doing so, they ignore the 
possibility that judgments of well-being can be influenced individual attributes such as 
values and needs, which are at the core of P-E fit theory (Edwards et al., 1998). Thus, by 
focusing on isolated relationships between affect and P and E respectively, the theories 
above provide an incomplete examination of the relationships between work-based affect 
and P-E fit. This is a serious limitation because it impedes our ability to analyze specific 
hypotheses regarding the relative effects of work-based affect on P and/or E components of 
fit, such as “under conditions of environmental uncertainty the relationship between work-
based affect and E would be stronger compared to the relationship between affect and P”.   
Joint nonlinear relationships.  Following on, the affective-consistency 
perspective also cannot account for any joint nonlinear relationships between P, E, and 
work-based affect. While many functional forms may describe the relationship between P 
and E and affect, it is commonly assumed that the relationship between P-E fit and work-
based affect is represented by a curvilinear relationship where positive outcomes are 
maximized when P and E are congruent with each other. This relationship is illustrated in 
figure 3. The horizontal axis represents various combinations of P and E, while the vertical 
axis represents work-based affect. Assuming that P is held constant at a moderate level, 
affect decreases as the environment deviates from P in either direction. Notice however that 
when E exceeds P, a negative relationship exists between E and affect. Conversely, in the 
region where E is less than P, there is a positive relationship between E and affect. It should 
thus be clear that there are two pieces of information that are required to predict the 
relationship between work-based affect and E. First, one has to know the level of P relative 
to E. Second, one also needs to know the form of the function that jointly relates P and E to 
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work-based affect, where in this case it is assumed to be a curvilinear relationship1. With 
their isolated focus on relationships between affect and P and E respectively, theories 
underlining the affective-consistency perspective cannot facilitate investigation into 
relationships such as those mentioned above. Therefore, in order to facilitate investigations 
into the joint relationships between work-based affect and both E and P, the expanded 
theory of P-E fit in figure 2 positions work-based affect as a cause of both E and P 
constructs. 
Relationships between affect and objective P and E.  The theories reviewed 
above have also solely focused on the relationships between work-based affect and 
perceptions of subjective P and E. As such, their focus is constrained to only relationships 
between work-based affect and subjective P-E fit. This focus may prove overly restrictive 
because past research in other fields has established a link between affect and behaviors or 
attempts at altering one’s current situation. For instance, past research has established a 
strong link between positive moods and helping behaviors (Aderman, 1972; Clark & Isen, 
1982; Cunningham, Steinberg & Grev, 1980; Isen, Clark & Schwartz, 1976; Isen & Levin, 
1972). Work-based affect in the form of job satisfaction is also viewed as a key antecedent 
to efforts aimed at improving one’s organizational environment such as organizational 
citizenship behaviors (George & Brief, 1992; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine & Bachrach, 
2000). Likewise, findings that work-based affect is closely tied to core aspects of the self 
like self-esteem, self-efficacy, emotional stability, and locus of control also suggest that 
affect can be causally linked to various attributes of the objective person (Hulin & Judge, 
2003; Judge & Bono, 2001). These observations provide reason to believe that work-based 
                                                 
1 Edwards et al. (1998) proposed the existence of three distinct forms of relationships (i.e. asymptotic, 
monotonic, and U-shaped) that describe the link between P-E fit and outcomes. 
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affect can be a cause of both objective and subjective P and E. Therefore, in the interest of 
providing a more comprehensive framework for testing relationships between work-based 
affect and objective and subjective P-E fit, the expanded model of P-E fit reflects affect to 
be a cause of both objective and subjective components of P-E fit. 
Asymmetry in positive and negative affective influence. The theories covered so 
far have largely assumed that P-E fit would be biased in the same direction as experienced 
work-based affect. Hence, it follows that positive affect would influence P and E in a 
positive fitting direction, whereas negative affect would similarly result in misfit between P 
and E. Interestingly, this later proposition seems to run counter to ideas from research on 
stress and coping which posit that individuals react to negative feelings by seeking to 
minimize discrepancies or misfit between person and environment characteristics 
(Edwards, 1992; French et al., 1974). In fact, coping and defense, which are responses to 
stress aimed at improving objective and subjective fit, are viewed as key outcomes of P-E 
misfit (Edwards et al., 1998). For example, a coping response is initiated when John 
responds to misfit between his desired autonomy and that which is present in his job by 
negotiating with his supervisor for increased control over his personal work schedule. This 
idea that people respond to negative moods by seeking to improve their current situations 
parallels ideas from the mood-regulation literature which also suggest that people strive to 
maintain positive moods  by engaging in thinking and/or behavior aimed at improving 
current feeling states (Larsen, 2000a; Larsen, 2000b; Morris & Reilly, 1987; Tice & 
Wallace, 2000). Therefore, both coping and mood-regulation literatures argue that negative 
affect causes people to seek out ways to improve their current situation. In a P-E fit context 
this can be achieved by attempting to improve either objective or subjective fit. Note that 
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this idea runs counter to the affective-consistency perspective, which contends that people 
in bad moods would simply end up thinking and behaving consistently with their negative 
mood, and thus perceive misfit between themselves and their environments. Hence, the fact 
that theories underlying the affective-consistency perspective do not account for the 
hedonistic motives just described may also constitute a limitation for consistency-based 
theories. This implies that relying on the affective-consistency perspective alone to 
adequately predict the relationships between work-based affect and P-E fit may be 
insufficient. Therefore, the next section presents an alternative hedonistic perspective 
which offers another explanation of how affect may cause P-E fit. 
A hedonistic perspective 
The second perspective that can account for work-based affect as a cause of P-E fit 
is termed the hedonistic perspective. This perspective encompasses ideas from job 
satisfaction, stress and coping, and mood regulation literatures, which are based on the 
assumption that people are motivated to feel good about their current situation. This leads 
them to seek to either change their current negative feelings to ones that are positive, or 
maintain the current positive moods that they are in (Larsen, 2000a; Morris & Reilly, 
1987). Hence, there are two possible consequences when a person is experiencing negative 
work-based affect: First, perceptions of the self (P) or the environment (E) can be adjusted 
so that so that they appear to fit with one another. This is described by the relationship 
between work-based affect and subjective P and E in Figure 2. For example, George tries to 
deal with his unhappiness with his job by perceiving that his job actually provides him with 
the right amount of job security that he needs. Second, one can also respond to negative 
work-based affect by attempting to achieve objective P-E fit by either adapting aspects of 
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oneself (P) (i.e. developing certain types of skills, interests, or goals) to the environment, or 
changing aspects of one’s work environment (E) (i.e. interacting more with similar co-
workers, or choosing jobs that coincide with one’s need for autonomy) to fit with personal 
attributes. In this case, George chooses to deal with his unhappiness by either changing the 
amount of security he requires (changing objective P) to match the amount that is currently 
provided by his job, or seeking to extend his current contract with his employer (changing 
objective E) to meet is need for more security. On the flip side, the hedonistic perspective 
also predicts that when positive work-based affect is being experienced, people would not 
be motivated to change their current P-E fit. Thus, since his positive work-based affect 
signals that he is already enjoying his current situation, George would make no attempt to 
change his P-E fit. In all, the hedonistic perspective posits that the relationships between 
work-based affect and objective and subjective P-E fit only exist when negative affect is 
experienced. The next few sections review the theoretical foundations of the hedonistic 
perspective.   
Theoretical foundations 
Hedonism as a basic goal. Maintaining a state of positive affect is widely 
assumed to be a basic and universal motivation for all humans. Much of our daily activities 
are geared toward avoiding or rectifying situations that make us feel bad, and similarly 
approaching or maintaining situations that make us feel good. This broad generalization of 
human routine can be attributed to a basic motive to feel or experience positive rather than 
negative affect either in the short or the long term (Larsen, 2000a). 
The basic need to feel good has been well documented in research on mood 
regulation. It is now widely accepted that instead of being passive when it comes to 
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experiencing affect, people adopt various strategies to manage their affective states even 
without any external requirement to do so (Clark & Isen, 1982; Larsen, 2000a; 2000b; 
Morris & Reilly, 1987; Tice & Wallace, 2000). Mood regulation involves two basic 
processes: maintenance and modification (or repair). Maintenance takes place when people 
work to preserve a desired affective state (usually assumed to be positive affect) against 
influences that threaten a change in that state. In contrast, modification or repair seeks to 
change an emotional state perceived as inadequate in the direction of the desired affective 
state (Krohne, Pieper, Knoll & Breimer, 2002). Evidence on the hedonistic tendency can be 
drawn from research in mood regulation that has documented attempts at maintaining 
positive moods by avoiding situations or behaviors that are expected to be disruptive of 
pleasant mood (Morris & Reilly, 1987), or engaging strategies aimed at improving current 
negative moods (Clark & Isen, 1982). For instance, Cialdini, Darby & Vincent (1973) 
found that people chose to engage in benevolent helping behavior when they were put into 
situations which induced negative affect. They account for this finding by suggesting that 
the altruistic act of helping serves to provide relief for people in negative affective states. 
Recent psychological research has started to pay more attention to what underlies 
happiness and optimal human functioning. Many contributors in a recent American 
Psychologist special issue on happiness, excellence, and optimal human functioning agree 
that obtaining and maintaining positive hedonic balance is a fundamental human goal 
(Buss, 2000; Larsen, 2000b). This view is aptly captured in Larsen’s statement that: “the 
psychological system is in fact designed to produce and maintain a positive hedonic 
balance, other things being equal” (Larsen, 2000b; p. 219). Empirical support for the 
hedonistic motivation is available. Diener (2000) surveyed people from 42 different 
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countries around the world, asking them to rate the importance of various goals in their 
lives. Results suggest that happiness and life satisfaction were very important to most 
people, even in societies that are not fully westernized (i.e. Indonesia and Bahrain). 
Furthermore, respondents also reported thinking often about happiness and life satisfaction. 
Interestingly, only 6% of respondents rated money as more important than happiness. In 
addition, 69% rated happiness at the top of the 7-point importance scale (extraordinarily 
important), and only 1% claimed to have never thought about it. Correspondingly, 62% 
rated life satisfaction at the top of the importance scale, and only 2% reported never having 
thought about it. Coupled with results indicating that people are in happy moods most of 
the time, these results highlight the fact that feeling good is not only a frequent hedonic 
state (Diener & Diener, 1996; Diener, Larsen & Emmons, 1985; Diener, Larson, Levine & 
Emmons, 1985), but also that it is an important goal in the lives of most people (Larsen, 
2000b). 
The hedonistic principle is also very relevant to our current discussion about the 
relationship between work-based affect and P-E fit. Results gathered from wide-scale 
surveys suggest that more people tend to be more satisfied rather than dissatisfied with their 
jobs. Hence, most people hold a hedonic experience that is affectively positive when it 
comes to their jobs (Bowling, Beehr, Wagner & Libkuman, 2005; Büssing, Bissels, Fuchs 
& Perrar, 1999). These results are consistent with Diener and Diener’s (1996) findings that 
most people are happy and satisfied with life domains such as work, marriage, health, and 
friendship, and their lives in general. The hedonistic perspective is thus based on the 
assumption that positive work-based affect is an important goal for people. Specifically, it 
suggests that people who are experiencing negative work-based affect try to improve their 
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current situation by thinking or behaving in ways that are targeted at improving or 
achieving P-E fit. In contrast, since positive work-based affect is a desirable state, people 
experiencing positive affect will not seek to change or act upon their P-E fit status. The 
logic behind this line of reasoning is evident in several well-established fields of research 
which will now be reviewed.    
Responses to job satisfaction.  Job satisfaction is widely viewed as an 
individual’s affective reaction to his or her job (Locke, 1984). In fact, in his early work on 
job satisfaction, Locke (1969, p. 316) defines it as “a pleasurable emotional state”. Based 
on this definition of job satisfaction as work-based affect, some have argued that work-
based affect acts as a catalyst for cognitive and/or behavioral responses to one’s job. 
According to Henne & Locke (1985), “job satisfaction and dissatisfaction are psychological 
states which allow for numerous and varied action alternatives” (p. 221). Such responses to 
work-based affect can either be psychological or behavioral. Psychological responses to 
negative work-based affect may include tolerance or focusing on valued aspects of the 
situation (i.e. “at least my employer pays me well”). People may also choose to withdraw 
psychologically by becoming passive or disinterested.  On the other hand, behavioral 
responses may include planning to leave the job or spending less time on the job (Locke, 
1984). This latter link between job dissatisfaction and behavioral withdrawal has garnered a 
significant amount of empirical support (Hanisch & Hulin, 1990; 1991; Hulin, 1991). The 
type of response that is enacted in response to dissatisfaction depends on the individual’s 
perception of the job situation, available job alternatives, and his or her own abilities and 
aspirations. Whichever type of response is chosen could have important implications for 
not only work-based affect, but also overall mental and physical well-being (Henne & 
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Locke, 1985; Locke, 1984). In all, there is considerable evidence suggesting that negative 
work-based affect stimulates cognitive and behavioral responses aimed at improving 
experienced affect. 
Perhaps the most well-known classification scheme for possible responses to work-
based affect over the past two decades is presented by the EVLN model. Farrell (1983) 
developed and proposed a typology of four possible behavioral responses to dissatisfaction 
at work. Based on the initial work of Hirschman (1970), this typology consists of exit (E), 
voice (V), loyalty (L), and neglect (N) behaviors. Exit refers to leaving the organization, or 
thinking about quitting, and looking for another job. Voice refers to attempts at trying to 
change the situation by having one’s opinion heard (i.e. suggesting solutions for problems 
or whistle blowing). Loyalty occurs by waiting patiently for things to improve, or trusting 
the organization to do the right thing. Lastly, neglect is characterized by behaviors such as 
chronic lateness or absenteeism. The EVLN framework further organizes these four 
response categories along two dimensions. Along the constructive-destructive dimension, 
voice and loyalty are considered behaviors that are constructive for maintaining the person-
organization relationship, while exit and neglect are considered destructive for this 
relationship. Along the second active-passive dimension, voice and exit are active 
behaviors that deal directly with a problematic situation, whereas loyalty and neglect are 
considered passive behaviors (Farrell, 1983; Hagedoorn, Van Yperen, Van De Vliert & 
Buunk, 1999; Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers & Mainous, 1988). Support for this framework has 
been evidenced in numerous studies (Farrell, 1983; Farrell & Rusbult, 1992; Leck & 
Saunders, 1992; Rusbult, et al., 1988; Rusbult & Lowery, 1985; Withey & Cooper, 1989). 
For instance, Rusbult and colleagues (1988) not only found that dissatisfaction (caused by 
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declining work conditions) was causally related to EVLN responses, but also that this 
relationship was moderated by variables such as personal investment and quality of job 
alternatives. Interestingly, it was also noticed that employees showed increasing intentions 
to engage in exit, voice, and neglect, with declining levels of loyalty, as a period of 
dissatisfaction unfolded.  
Similar ideas from the EVLN framework can also be found in theories of job 
withdrawal and adaptation. These theories view withdrawal behaviors like voluntary 
absenteeism, lateness, voluntary turnover, and retirement as not only responses to negative 
work-based affect, but also attempts to reduce negative affect through various behavioral 
and cognitive mechanisms (Hulin, 1991; Rosse & Hulin, 1985). For instance, the model of 
employee adaptation (Rosse & Miller, 1984) posits that events at work trigger evaluations 
of the work situation. If this evaluation is affectively negative, several remedial strategies 
are considered. The strategy that is perceived to be the most useful under the present 
circumstances will be implemented. The individual then evaluates the effects of his or her 
response; if negative affect still persists the cycle is repeated, possibly with a different 
adaptive strategy. In support of these models, Rosse and Hulin (1985) report that intentions 
to quit, turnover, absenteeism, and attempts to change one’s job were negatively related to 
job dissatisfaction among a longitudinal study of hospital employees. More importantly, the 
use of adaptive behaviors such as attempts at making positive changes to their job setting 
was found to have positive remedial effects for employee health and satisfaction. Overall, 
the EVLN framework and theories of job withdrawal and adaptation, suggest that negative 
work-based affect can motivate individuals to make changes to their actual or objective 
working environments. 
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Coping. Theories of coping, cybernetics, and mood regulation provide 
elucidating accounts of how people react to stressful situations. Together, these theories 
have the potential to contribute to our understanding of how and why individuals respond 
to work-based affect. Coping is “a complex, multidimensional process that is sensitive to 
the environment (i.e. its demands and resources), and to personality dispositions that 
influence the appraisal of stress and resources for coping” (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004; 
p. 747). Lazarus and Folkman (1984) further highlight the integral roles of both the person 
and environment in the coping process by defining coping as the thoughts and behaviors 
that people employ to manage the internal and external demands of situations that are 
appraised as stressful. People therefore cope and respond actively to stressful forces that act 
upon them in order to avoid being harmed by life strains (Pearlin & Schooler, 1978).  
Lazarus's transactional model is one of the most prominent theories about the 
coping process. It states that stress arises from interaction between the person and the 
environment (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). This cognitive-oriented theory focuses on the 
importance of two main types of appraisals in the coping process. Primary appraisal helps 
ascertain the significance of a particular situation by determining whether the transaction 
hinders or facilitates the individual’s goals (Perrewé & Zellars, 1999; Smith & Lazarus, 
1990). Situations involving harm, loss, threat, or challenge to the individual’s well-being 
are appraised as stressful (Lazarus, 1993). If primary appraisal determines that a situation is 
significant to the individual, it is followed by secondary appraisal, which involves the 
evaluation of coping alternatives with the goal of creating a less stressful situation. A third 
form of appraisal, reappraisal, then occurs after the initial coping attempt when the 
individual reassesses the state of the person-environment relationship. The coping process 
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ceases when the situation is resolved and no longer perceived to be stressful. Lazarus and 
colleagues have published a significant amount of research in support of the transactional 
model (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). Such research has typically shown that people’s 
evaluations of their well-being and their subsequent coping behavior influence the amount 
of psychological stress that is ultimately experienced (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004; 
Lazarus, 1993). 
 Lazarus’ view of coping considers a variety of cognitive and behavioral responses 
that people use to manage stressful situations (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004). Early 
attempts at classifying different types of coping behavior gave rise to the popular categories 
of problem-focused and emotion-focused coping. Problem-focused coping refers to 
attempts at altering the person-environment relationship, while emotion-focused coping 
consists of attempts at regulating emotions that accompany the stressful experience 
(Folkman & Lazarus, 1980; Latack & Havlovic, 1992; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). In the 
past two decades, many other classification schemes for coping functions have been 
proposed either as complements or alternatives to problem and emotion-focused categories 
(Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004; Skinner, Edge, Altman & Sherwood, 2003). Among others, 
these include: Moos and Billings’ (1982) introduction of appraisal focused coping, which 
refer to attempts at redefining the meaning of a situation via appraisal and reappraisal; and 
alloplastic versus autoplastic coping , which refer to  coping directed at changing the 
environment as opposed to coping directed toward changing the self respectively  (Perrez 
& Reicherts, 1992). This rapid proliferation of coping categories has led to increasing 
concern about the validity and conceptual clarity of these classification schemes (Latack & 
Havlovic, 1992; Skinner et al., 2003). Despite these concerns, it seems clear that coping 
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can involve both cognitive and behavioral attempts to influence both aspects of the self and 
environment. When applied to a P-E fit framework, this implies that coping behavior can 
involve efforts to change both subjective and objective P-E fit. 
Cybernetics and control theory. Many of the main principles that underlie 
Lazarus’s transactional model are similar to those that govern cybernetics or control theory 
(Edwards, 1992; Powers, 1978). Cybernetics, or control theory concerns the functioning of 
self-regulating systems (Ashby, 1966; Carver & Shier, 1982). The theory’s main focus is 
on the negative feedback loop, which acts to minimize or discrepancies between aspects of 
the environment and relevant reference criteria (Edwards, 1992). As illustrated in figure 4, 
the input function senses the present situation. This perception is then evaluated against a 
relevant point of reference by the comparator mechanism. If a discrepancy is detected 
between the present state and the reference criteria, the output function is tasked with 
attempting to reduce or eliminate the discrepancy. This self-regulatory process may be 
initiated by a disturbance in the environment or a change in the reference criterion, which 
essentially creates the discrepancy (Edwards, 1992). Thus, the main purpose of the 
feedback system in cybernetics is to create and maintain the perception of a specific desired 
condition, which is whatever condition constitutes its reference criteria or standard of 
comparison (Carver & Scheier, 1982). Past research on cybernetics elaborate on this basic 
framework to include effects of the output function on the reference criterion (Campion & 
Lord, 1982) and causal relationships and hierarchical arrangements among multiple 
feedback loops (Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1982; Powers, 1978). In the organizational 
sciences, this theory has also been used to predict relationships between goal setting, task 
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performance, feedback, and future goal setting (Campion & Lord, 1982; Hollenbeck, 1989; 
Phillips, Hollenbeck & Ilgen, 1996; Hollenbeck & Williams, 1987). 
The relevance of cybernetics to our current focus on relationships involving work-
based affect and P-E fit is addressed specifically in Edwards’ (1992) cybernetic theory of 
stress, coping, and well-being in organizations. This model views stress, coping, and well-
being as key components of a cybernetic feedback loop. It essentially argues that stress, 
which is causally related to work-based affect and defined as the discrepancy between an 
individual’s perceived state and desired state, leads to two types of outcomes: well-being 
and coping. More importantly, stress may indirectly activate coping, or “efforts to prevent 
or reduce the negative effects of stress on well-being” (p. 245), through its influence on 
well-being.  
According to Edwards (1992), coping reduces stress and improves well-being in 
several ways: (a) First, coping can involve attempts to improve well-being directly such as 
meditation and relaxation (Newman & Beehr, 1979). Such curative methods correspond to 
the above-described category of emotion-focused coping, and are more likely to be 
employed when stressful discrepancies seem unsolvable (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). (b) 
Coping can also involve reducing the importance associated with the perceived source of 
stress. Such altering of desires and importance corresponds to previously conceived notions 
of appraisal-focused coping (Moos & Billings, 1982), and defense (Edwards et al., 1998). 
(c) Next, coping also consists of efforts to alter perceptions of the work environment. This 
entails altering the physical and social environment, social information, and the cognitive 
reconstruction of reality (i.e. problem-focused coping). This type of coping is especially 
relevant in the current P-E fit context because changing the physical and social 
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environment can also be viewed as attempts at altering the objective work environment. 
Similarly, activities that involve altering social information (i.e. deemphasizing negative 
information and seeking out new sources of information), and cognitive reconstruction (i.e. 
repressing, denying, or distorting negative aspects of the situation) are essentially attempts 
to directly modify perceptions of the subjective work environment. (d) People may also 
adopt a less proactive way of coping by trying to avoid a stressful situation. Such efforts 
may include directing one’s attention away from a stressful discrepancy (Edwards, 1992; 
Edwards & Baglioni, 1993; Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoeck, & Rosenthal, 1964). (e) The last 
mechanism via which coping influences stress is by adjusting desires to conform with 
perceptions of the situation, eliminating the stressful discrepancy in the process. Such 
activity is evidenced in attempts to adjust personal goals or standards in response to 
positive or negative feedback (Campion & Lord, 1982; Taylor, Fisher, Ilgen, 1984). 
Therefore, these various coping mechanisms suggest that coping may be directed toward 
changing both objective and subjective forms of the environment and person. Overall, this 
theory of stress and coping emphasizes the hedonistic perspective’s point that work-based 
affect causes coping which can entail altering elements that make up objective and 
subjective P-E fit. 
Evaluating hedonistic perspective theories 
To recap, there are several important ideas that resonate strongly among the theories 
reviewed above that elucidate the ability of work-based affect to cause P-E fit. First, these 
theories commonly assume that individuals seek to achieve or maintain an ultimate desired 
state which is characterized by positive affect. Hence, situations characterized by negative 
affect initiate behavioral responses from people aimed at improving negative affect. The 
35 
 
  
theories also collectively suggest that responses to negative affect can be both cognitive 
and behavioral. Therefore, in response to negative work-based affect people can either 
change their subjective perceptions of the situation or take actual steps to change the 
situation. Furthermore, the person (P) and the environment (E) are two common targets for 
change during these cognitive and behavioral responses. This means that people respond to 
negative affect by either attempting to change aspects of themselves (i.e. wants and goals), 
or their social environments (i.e. jobs and organizations). The hedonistic perspective thus 
predicts that the experience of negative work-based affect would cause people to act on 
objective and/or subjective P and/or E, where they will try to adjust P and/or E so as to 
achieve the desirable situation of P-E fit. In contrast, people already experiencing positive 
work-based affect would not be motivated to take action to change their current desirable 
circumstances. Consequently, work-based affect will not be related to P-E fit when there is 
positive work-based affect.  
Despite providing significant evidence for work-based affect to be antecedent to P-
E fit, there are limitations to these theories’ ability to account for all the relationships 
predicted by the expanded theory of P-E fit.  Like theories linked to the affective-
consistency perspective, the hedonistic theories reviewed above only account for the 
isolated influence of affect on either the person or the environment. As pointed out earlier, 
this is a serious shortcoming when it comes to P-E fit research because the concept of P-E 
fit is defined as a joint relationship between elements of both person and environment 
(Edwards et al., 1998; Kristof, 1996). Hence, predicting isolated relationships between 
affect and the person and environment respectively gives rise to a limited understanding of 
the relationship between work-based affect and fit. This problem appears especially evident 
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when we consider that coping responses to negative affect often simultaneously involve a 
whole repertoire of strategies that might target both the person and the environment 
(Skinner et al., 2003). Therefore, this limitation restricts our ability to examine the relative 
effects of work-based affect on person and environment attributes, which could differ 
according various situational and individual differences (Edwards, 1992). Lastly, as in the 
case of the affective-consistency perspective, only focusing on these isolated relationships 
which separate P and E also makes it impossible to account for joint nonlinear relationships 
between the person, the environment, and work-based affect (Edwards et al., 1998).
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
PROPOSITIONS OF THE EXPANDED P-E FIT MODEL 
Now that the theoretical basis for work-based affect as a cause of P-E fit has been 
discussed, ideas from the affective-consistency and hedonistic perspectives are distilled and 
presented in the form of propositions that are based on the expanded P-E fit model. It is 
hoped that these propositions would serve as a platform from which further research into P-
E fit can be generated. 
Affective-consistency perspective 
 The affective-consistency perspective argues that to be affectively consistent 
individuals who experience positive work-based affect would aim to have fit between 
themselves and their environments. Since P-E fit is the relationship between elements of 
the person (P) and the environment (E), individuals can achieve P-E fit by adapting 
subjective and/or objective P to be in line with their environment counterparts, changing 
the subjective and/or objective E to match person attributes, or adjusting both P and E 
simultaneously so that they converge into a fitting relationship. 
Proposition 1: According to the affective-consistency perspective, when positive 
work-based affect is experienced, individuals will try to achieve P-E fit by (a) 
adjusting subjective and/or objective P to fit with the environment; (b) adjusting 
subjective and/or objective E to fit with person attributes; or (c) adjusting both 
subjective and/or objective P and E so that they come together into a fitting 
relationship. 
 
 
  
 A symmetric type of relationship is proposed for individuals experiencing negative 
work-based affect, who would try to achieve an affectively-consistent misfit between 
themselves and their environments. 
Proposition 2: According to the affective-consistency perspective, when negative 
work-based affect is experienced, individuals will try to achieve P-E misfit by (a) 
adjusting subjective and/or objective P to create a discrepancy with the 
environment; (b) adjusting subjective and/or objective E to create a discrepancy 
with person attributes; or (c) adjusting both subjective and/or objective P and E so 
that they diverge from each other to form P-E misfit. 
Hedonistic perspective 
On the other hand, the hedonistic perspective argues that individuals are motivated 
to experience positive work-based affect. Hence, they are either content to remain in their 
current positive levels of affect, or deal with negative affect by changing certain aspects 
about their situation in order to achieve P-E fit.  
Proposition 3: According to the hedonistic perspective, when positive work-based 
affect is experienced, there will be no relationship between work-based affect and 
P-E fit. 
Proposition 4: According to the hedonistic perspective, when negative work-based 
affect is experienced, individuals will try to generate P-E fit by (a) adjusting 
subjective and/or objective P to fit with the environment; (b) adjusting subjective 
and/or objective E to fit with person attributes; or (c) adjusting both subjective 
and/or objective P and E so that they come together into a fitting relationship. 
Determinants of affective influence on objective and subjective P-E fit 
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It should be apparent from the propositions presented above that there are several 
ways in which affect can cause individuals to change P-E fit. First, work-based affect can 
either influence subjective P-E fit directly, or it can also influence subjective P-E fit 
indirectly through its effect on objective P-E fit. Second, P-E fit consists of person (P) and 
environment (E) components, both of which are susceptible to affective influence 
according to the current P-E fit model. The next section presents a short discussion on the 
factors that influence when people attempt to change either objective or subjective P-E fit. 
Correspondingly, factors that should influence attempts to change either P or E components 
to P-E fit are also discussed. 
Objective versus subjective P-E fit.  Individual and environmental factors 
influence the individuals’ propensity to directly change objective or subjective P-E fit. 
People with relevant abilities such as negotiation and conflict resolution skills should be 
more likely and able to act on objective P-E fit than others with lesser of these skills. 
Furthermore, those who are in leadership or influential positions within their organizations 
should also be more likely to change objective P-E fit because of their power and ability to 
control and enact changes in their work arrangements (Avolio, Sosik, Jung & Berson, 
2003). Individual perceptions of controllability should also determine whether people act 
on objective or subjective elements of P-E fit (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004; Perrewé & 
Zellars, 1999). Situations that are perceived to be more controllable are more susceptible to 
changes in objective fit. Similarly, assuming the existence of hedonistic relationships, 
individuals with more coping efficacy (i.e. those who believe themselves to be capable of 
controlling a specific threatening situation) should also be more likely to try to change 
actual stressful situations (Bandura, 1986, 1997). Hence, these individuals should also be 
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more likely to attempt to change objective fit compared to those who have less coping 
efficacy.  
Environmental factors like available job alternatives can also determine whether 
affective influence operates directly on objective or subjective P-E fit. If more job 
alternatives are available, individuals may be more proactive in attempting to change 
objective aspects of P-E fit because they can easily seek out alternative job environments as 
part of their attempts to change their situation (Henne & Locke, 1985; Locke, 1984; 
Rusbult et al., 1988). Organizational policies and barriers may also influence individuals’ 
choice to act on objective or subjective fit (Edwards, 1992). A more bureaucratic 
organization with more levels of hierarchy and procedural red tape would make it more 
difficult for individuals to adjust objective P-E fit. Hence, people in such situations may be 
forced to rely more on cognitive strategies that influence subjective P-E fit. Leaders or 
supervisors who are more willing to work with their subordinates to effect change into their 
work environments (e.g. widening one’s job scope to accommodate increased amounts of 
autonomy and variety), and even to subordinates’ own attributes (e.g. proving additional 
training to enable them to take on increased skill demands), can also make changes to 
objective P-E fit more likely.  
Person versus Environment.  Though it has been documented in coping and 
cybernetics research that altering personal attributes like desires occur less frequently than 
changes in perceptions of the environment in general (Campion & Lord, 1982; Edwards, 
1992; Taylor et a1, 1984), certain individual and situation-based factors can still influence 
whether people respond to work-based affect by adjusting person (P) or environment (E) 
components of P-E fit. At the individual level, certain personality variables should 
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influence the relative likelihood of changing P or E. Individuals with an internal locus of 
control should be more likely to try to change their environments compared to those with 
external locus of control (Edwards, 1992). Conversely, people with a high degree of self-
consciousness (i.e. tendency to direct attention towards aspects of the self) should be more 
willing and able to initiate changes to person attributes since people logically have to be 
aware of personal attributes before they can change them (Fenigstein, Scheier & Buss, 
1975; Fenigstein, 1979). Situational job and organizational factors could also influence 
individual’s  propensity to act on P or E. Stable job environments that are characterized by 
little uncertainty should be perceived to be less susceptible to adjustment. Thus, individuals 
would be less likely to seek to change E in such environments. Similarly, formalized and 
restrictive job environments where individuals are given little say over the structure and 
planning of their work also make changes in E less likely. 
Conflicting predictions 
One may also notice that the propositions offered based on the affective-consistency 
and hedonistic perspectives differ considerably from each other. According to the affective-
consistency perspective, individuals who are experiencing positive work-based affect will 
work to achieve P-E fit by aligning E and P. Conversely, the hedonistic perspective argues 
that these same individuals will not act upon P-E fit. As for individuals who are 
experiencing negative work-based affect, the hedonistic perspective pictures individuals as 
active respondents to negative affect by seeking to achieve P-E fit by aligning E and P, 
while the affective-consistency perspective argues that the need to be consistent with one’s 
feelings should lead to efforts to separate or misalign E and P to create P-E misfit. While 
only future research can shed light onto which of these two perspectives better account for 
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relationships between work-based affect and P-E fit, it is also possible that other factors 
outside the current P-E fit framework can influence which of these two perspectives 
prevail. The next section first presents a review of past research that might help resolve the 
conflicting predictions of these two perspectives. This review is followed by a discussion of 
the possible factors that might influence the prevalence of consistency or hedonistic 
relationships. 
Resolving the consistency versus hedonism debate 
Primacy of self-enhancement: Self consistency serves self enhancement. Similar 
debates have surfaced before previous research over the present issue of the contradictory 
predictions offered by consistency and hedonistic perspectives. Research in person 
perception and social evaluation suggests that hedonistic motives are primary to 
consistency motives, where consistency motives operate in order to serve overall hedonistic 
goals. Jones (1973) provides initial support for the primacy of hedonistic self-esteem 
enhancement over consistency motives. His review of 16 studies based on competing 
hypotheses from hedonistic self-enhancement and self-consistency theories concluded that 
hedonistic theories seemed to have stronger support compared to consistency theories. 
Furthermore, he also argued that studies that provided support for consistency motives 
could be accounted for within an expanded hedonistic framework where consistency-based 
behavior in fact served hedonistic goals. For instance, low self-evaluators might prefer 
similar consistent low evaluations from others if they perceive the risk of future social 
embarrassment from the exposure of the discrepancy between other’s expectancies and 
their actual abilities. Findings by Elliott (1986) also support lend support to the primacy of 
hedonism over consistency. His findings suggest that people experiencing low self-esteem 
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prefer to change so that they can think better of themselves. This causes them to be less 
consistent. Conversely, people with high self-esteem have no need to change and hence 
prefer to remain consistent with their self concept.   
On a similar note, some view cognitive consistency as a sub-goal that services an 
overarching hedonistic self-esteem regulatory mechanism. Most notably, Tesser and 
colleagues contend that cognitive consistency is one of several interchangeable 
mechanisms (the others being social comparison and self-affirmation) that can be used to 
regulate self-esteem (Tesser, 2000; Tesser, Crepaz, Collins, Cornell & Beach, 2000). 
According to them, threats to self-esteem that are manifested in the experience of negative 
affect cause one to engage in one or several self-esteem maintenance strategies. For 
instance, evidence indicates that a threat to the self that is brought about by cognitive 
dissonance can be reduced by a favorable social comparison outcome (Tesser, 2000 p. 294; 
Tesser et al., 2000). High dissonance participants who believed that they were 
outperformed by a comparison other on an unimportant task reported feeling closer to the 
comparison other than dissonance participants who thought that they were outperformed on 
an important task. This is consistent with predictions from social comparison and the self-
evaluation maintenance (SEM) model in particular (Tesser, 1988), which suggests that 
being outperformed on an important task by a close other is particularly threatening. In 
contrast, being outperformed by a close other on an unimportant task allows one to bask in 
the reflected glory of the other’s success (Cialdini, Borden, Thorne, Walker, Freeman & 
Stone, 1976). The results of this study therefore suggest that cognitive consistency and 
social comparison processes represent different mechanisms that serve the same hedonistic 
goal of self-esteem maintenance.  
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Steele and Liu (1983) provide more evidence for the idea that the drive for 
consistency is just one of several mechanisms used to bolster self-esteem. They found that 
people who experienced cognitive dissonance and were also given the opportunity to self-
affirm by increasing the salience of their economic and political orientation were less likely 
to engage in dissonance reduction by changing their attitudes than people who did not self-
affirm. Hence, self-affirmation and cognitive dissonance seem to serve a unitary goal of 
regulating self-esteem and its accompanying affective experience. This view is consistent 
to that of those who view cognitive dissonance to be a threat to self-esteem (Aronson, 
1992; Tesser et al., 2000; p. 1477). Overall, the ideas from past research discussed in this 
section suggest that there is reason to believe that hedonistic motives may also outweigh 
affective-consistency concerns in the realm of P-E fit theory. 
Proposition 3: When compared against each other, hedonistic relationships prevail 
over affective-consistency relationships.  
Boundary variables 
Another way of resolving conflicting arguments posed by affective-consistency and 
hedonistic perspectives is by delineating boundary or moderator variables that influence the 
relative strength of each perspective (Dipboye, 1977). The discussion of boundary variables 
might prove fruitful in this case because individual and situational constraints have been 
known to influence the strength of both consistency and hedonistic drives. For instance, 
Hulin (1991) has argued that adaptive responses to dissatisfaction such as withdrawal 
behaviors are likely to be a function of personal and situational constraints (Hulin, 1991). 
Similarly, research has also pointed to individual and situational factors as key 
determinants of the drive to be consistent (Schwarz, 1990; Cialdini, Trost & Newsome, 
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1995). It is therefore plausible that both individual and situational boundary variables 
influence whether consistency or hedonistic arguments prevail in the current P-E fit model. 
Preference for consistency.  Individuals differ according to the degree in 
which they are “motivated toward cognitive consistency and will change their beliefs, 
attitudes, perceptions, and actions to achieve it” (Cialdini, Trost & Newsome, 1995; p. 
318). Recent research suggests that individuals differ according to their preference for 
consistency (PFC) or the tendency to respond to stimuli in a way that integrates and makes 
those stimuli consistent with existing variables (Brown, Asher & Cialdini, 2005; Cialdini et 
al., 1995; Newby-Clark, McGregor & Zanna, 2002). High-PFC individuals place 
considerable importance on existing attributes such as expectations, commitments, and 
choices. This leads them to assimilate new information or subsequent behavior to be 
consistent with their existing attributes. Low-PFC individuals, on the other hand, do not 
place too much importance on the implications of such existing attributes when deciding 
how to respond to new stimuli or situations. Thus, individuals with high-PFC would be 
more inclined to have their attitudes and perceptions fit with experienced work-based 
affect. As preference for consistency should not be related to individual ability or drive to 
regulate negative affect, we should expect the preference for consistency to influence the 
relative strength of consistency and hedonistic relationships.  
Proposition 4: The preference for consistency will influence the relative strength of 
affective-consistency and hedonistic relationships between work-based affect and P-
E fit such that affective-consistency relationships are stronger than hedonistic 
relationships for high-PFC individuals, while affective-consistency relationships are 
weaker than hedonistic relationships for low-PFC individuals. 
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Self-esteem.  Another individual variable that may influence the relative 
strength of consistency and hedonistic arguments is self-esteem. Self-esteem (SE) is a 
component of the self-concept that has been defined in several ways (Rosenberg, 1979; 
Smith & Petty, 1995). Some theorists view SE as an individual's global evaluation of the 
self (Brown & Mankowski, 1993), while others suggest that SE is determined by the 
combination of one's evaluations of self-worth, which is in turn influenced by the perceived 
ability to achieve desired goals (Burke, 1983). Research on SE has typically found that in 
comparison to low-SE individuals, individuals with high-SE are not only more confident 
about their abilities, but also more confident that their efforts will lead to success 
(Baumgardner, 1990; Campbell, 1990). These findings also translate to instances of coping 
and mood-regulation where self-esteem has been shown to be useful in predicting people's 
reactions to aversive events. Compared to people with high-SE, low-SE individuals have 
been shown to respond to aversive events with greater negative affect (e.g., Moreland & 
Sweeney, 1984), to react to negative feedback by overgeneralizing it to other aspects of 
their identities (e.g., Kernis, Brockner, & Frankel, 1989), to recall more negative thoughts 
when in negative moods (Smith & Perry, 1995), and to lower their self-evaluations (i.e. by 
engaging in self-depreciation) when placed in negative moods (Brown & Mankowski, 
1993). Overall, research findings tend to suggest that individuals with high SE respond to 
negative situations more positively and proactively than low SE individuals (Smith & 
Petty, 1995; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Self-esteem therefore is a useful indicator of both 
ability and motivation to regulate negative affect (Smith & Petty, 1995). Consequently, 
hedonistic drives should be more dominant in high self-esteem people compared to those 
with low self-esteem. Interestingly, research has shown self esteem to have the opposite 
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effect on the drive for consistency. Steele and colleagues (1993) observed that individuals 
with high self-esteem (HSE) engaged in less rationalizing of a dissonant activity compared 
to their low self-esteem (LSE) counterparts. Hence, HSE individuals were less motivated to 
be consistent than LSE individuals.  
Proposition 4: Self-esteem will influence the relative strength of affective-
consistency and hedonistic relationships between work-based affect and P-E fit such 
that hedonistic relationships are stronger than affective-consistency relationships for 
high-SE individuals, while hedonistic relationships are weaker than affective-
consistency relationships for low-PFC individuals. 
 Time constraints and cognitive demands.  The relative strength of 
consistency and hedonistic relationships can also be influenced by situational variables. 
According to the mood-as-information hypothesis, people are more likely to base 
evaluative judgments on feelings-based information when time constraints or cognitive 
demands limit processing ability required to form a judgment (Schwarz, 1990). Time and 
cognitive demands strengthen affective-consistency relationships by causing individuals to 
(a) attend selectively to situational cues that either maintain or confirm existing levels of 
affect, (b) impute desirable/ undesirable attributes to judgments that the individual already 
regards as satisfying/dissatisfying; and (c) cognitively restructure and redefine situational 
cues so that they will be consistent with work-based affect (James et al., 1978; James & 
Jones, 1980). Hence, when individuals are in situations that limit their ability to assess the 
nature of person and environment attributes, they would be more inclined to look to their 
affective experiences for information on the status of their P-E fit.  
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Following on, many of the cognitive processes that are central to the hedonistic 
perspective such as primary and secondary appraisal (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) and the 
negative feedback loop (Carver & Scheier, 1982; Edwards, 1992) implicitly assume that the 
individual has the ability and motivation to engage in a series of mental processes that 
facilitate regulation processes. For instance, in Lazarus’ transaction model, primary 
appraisal first requires a person to assess whether a particular situation hinders or facilitates 
his or her goals. This process is followed by secondary appraisal, which requires a more 
detailed assessment subsequent implementation of available coping alternatives. Thus, if 
we can assume that individuals tend to stay away from detailed mental processes when 
placed under situational and cognitive demands (Tversky, 1972; March & Simon, 1958), it 
is likely that time constraints and cognitive demands weaken hedonistic processes by 
hindering the above- mentioned cognitive processes. Hence, time and cognitive demands 
influence the relative strength of consistency and hedonistic relationships by making it 
more likely that individuals would engage in heuristic affective-consistency processes 
compared to more cognitively deliberate processes that characterize hedonistic 
relationships. 
Proposition 5: Time and cognitive demands will influence the relative strength of 
affective-consistency and hedonistic relationships between work-based affect and P-
E fit such that affective-consistency relationships are stronger than hedonistic 
relationships when time is limited or cognitive demands are high, while hedonistic 
relationships are stronger than affective-consistency relationships when time is 
unlimited or cognitive demands are low. 
Temporal sequence 
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The view that affective-consistency processes may operate in a more heuristical 
way compared to more deliberate and rational hedonistic process may also suggest an 
alternative form of integration between these two perspectives: Both processes may be 
operating during different temporal points of a particular work experience. In other words, 
it could be the case where consistency relationships dominate the immediate or early 
reaction to affective experience because of their heuristic nature. Conversely, hedonistic 
processes might dominate once careful processing or coping strategies have time to 
develop. This view is consistent with past observations that time is required in order for 
mood repair processes to operate efficiently. Sedikides (1994) found evidence for such a 
relationship between consistency and hedonistic motives. Subjects in his research were 
assigned to sad, neutral, or happy moods, and then asked to describe themselves freely in 
writing. Consistency effects were observed when sad moods produced negative self-
descriptions in the initial half of participants’ self descriptions. However, these negative 
self-descriptions eventually gave way to more positive self-descriptions in the later part of 
participants’ descriptions. Similar observations were made by Josephson and colleagues 
(1996), who examined whether mood repair was facilitated via the retrieval of memories. 
Participants in this study were assigned to a sad or neutral mood condition. After the mood 
induction, they were asked to recall 2 memories, rate their affective responses to these 
memories, and indicate why they chose the valance (i.e. positive versus negative) and order 
of the memories. Affective-consistency relationships were evidenced by the recalling of 
negative memories. These relationships were observed in 73% of participants in the sad 
mood condition who recalled negative first memories. Hedonistic relationships were 
subsequently observed in 53% of these participants, who proceeded to recall positive 
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thoughts for their second memory. Interestingly, when asked for a reason why they recalled 
these positive second memories, 68% of these participants indicated cited their desire to 
change their negative moods. In all, these findings suggest that consistency and hedonistic 
relationships may operate at different points in time following affective experiences 
(Krohne et al., 2002). 
Proposition 6: Affective-consistency relationships dominate during the period 
immediately following an affective experience while hedonistic relationships grow 
stronger with the passage of time. 
Summary and discussion 
 This paper has so far sought to present an improved model of P-E fit, where the role 
of work-based affect as an antecedent and cause of P-E fit is highlighted. Two perspectives 
were presented to account for the causal effect of work-based affect on P-E fit. The 
affective-consistency perspective posits that people would try to adjust P-E fit so that it is 
consistent with experienced work-based affect. Hence, those currently experiencing 
positive affect would try to adjust the person (P) and/or the environment (E) so as to 
achieve a similarly consistent desirable state of P-E fit between the two. Conversely, people 
who are experiencing negative affect would adjust P and/or E so as to have the P-E misfit 
that is consistent with their experienced negative affect. In contrast to the affective-
consistency perspective, the hedonistic perspective predicts that negative work-based affect 
would cause people to attempt to change P and E so as to achieve the desirable state of P-E 
fit. However, it also predicts that no change to P-E fit would be observed among people 
who are already experiencing positive affect since they are already satisfied with their 
current situation.  
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By outlining the role of work-based affect in P-E fit theory, these perspectives help 
address three important issues which have hindered the advancement of P-E fit research. 
First, previous assumptions about the unidirectional relationship between fit and work-
based affect are challenged. By explicating potential ways in which objective and 
subjective P-E fit can be subject to influence from work-based affect, the expanded P-E fit 
model presents researchers with new opportunities to investigate possible reciprocal and/or 
cyclical relationships involving affect and P-E fit. Second, by highlighting work-based 
affect’s role as a cause of P-E fit, the present model also helps to address the lack of 
knowledge about the individual level antecedents to P-E fit. Therefore, research in P-E fit 
can now be positioned to facilitate more comprehensive investigations into both individual 
and situational level causes of P-E fit. Third, the current expanded P-E fit model also 
provides a theoretical basis for explaining how and why objective and subjective P-E fit 
may not correspond closely with each other. This model thus incorporates the theoretical 
weight of past findings of the affective causes behind subjective perceptions of individual 
and environmental attributes. It is hoped that the propositions generated from the expanded 
model of P-E fit would serve as a springboard for further research that addresses these 
issues that have plagued P-E fit research. The next section describes and reports on a study 
that is based on some of the new ideas that have been presented so far.
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 The present study examines several of the key relationships that are proposed by the 
expanded P-E fit model illustrated in figure 2. Specifically, I investigate the key 
propositions that (a) work-based affect causes subjective environment (E) and person (P) 
perceptions, and that (b) fit between subjective E and P would lead to positive affective 
work attitudes. Hence, the model tested turns out to be a reduced form of the full model 
which was presented earlier in figure 2. This reduced model is illustrated in figure 5. The 
next section is devoted to the development of specific hypotheses regarding the 
relationships between the afore-mentioned constructs. 
Relationships between work-based affect and E and P 
The affective consistency and hedonistic perspectives lead to different predictions 
concerning the influence of work-based affect on the subjective environment (E) and 
person (P). As will be explained in the following discussion, these relationships are 
dependent on the relative levels of E and P. Therefore, hypotheses are presented here 
according to three relative levels of P and E (i.e. E greater than P, E less than P, and E 
equal to P). To illustrate these hypotheses, I have included graphs that depict the proposed 
relationships.  
These hypotheses are also based on the overarching premise is that affect is greatest 
when P and E are equal, consistent with a parabolic relationship between P-E fit and work-
based affect that is displayed in figure 3 (Edwards et al., 1998; Locke, 1976; Rice, 
 
 
  
McFarlin, Hunt & Near, 1985)2. As will be seen, the hypotheses contrast positive and 
negative work-based affect to neutral affect, distinctions that are important to the differing 
predictions yielded by the affective consistency and hedonistic perspectives. 
Affective-consistency perspective 
The affective consistency perspective argues that subjective E and P will be 
adjusted in ways that are consistent with work-based affect. This perspective leads to three 
sets of relationships linking work-based affect to subjective E and P that depend on whether 
E is greater than P, E is less than P, or E and P are equal. 
When E is greater than P.  In this case, when affect shifts from neutral to 
positive, subjective E will decrease and subjective P will increase, thereby increasing 
subjective P-E fit.  These adjustments in subjective E and P are explained by the core 
premise of the affective consistency perspective, which asserts that people develop 
cognitions that are consistent with their affective experiences.  Because positive affect is 
consistent with P-E fit, people who experience positive affect will subjectively skew E and 
P toward P-E fit, aligning them with their affective state.  Conversely, when affect shifts 
from neutral to negative, subjective E will increase and subjective P will decrease, thereby 
decreasing subjective fit. As negative affect is consistent with P-E misfit, people who 
experience negative affect will align E and P with their affective state by subjectively 
skewing E and P toward P-E misfit. These relationships lead us to the following hypothesis 
when E is greater than P: 
                                                 
2 In reality, many functional forms may relate the person and environment to affect (Edwards et al., 1998). 
For instance, Cable and Edwards (2004) found that 38% of need fulfillment P-E fit relationships were in fact 
asymptotic, where although outcomes like job satisfaction were maximized when P-E fit existed, people were 
not adversely affected when excess supplies (e.g. relationships and prestige) were offered by the organization. 
Therefore, while assuming a parabolic relationship between P, E and affect is consistent with most 
conventional ideas underlying P-E fit research, it should be noted that other functional forms exist and that 
any propositions based on a causal relationship linking work-based affect and P-E fit are dependent on the 
type of functional form assumed. 
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Hypothesis 1a. When affect is positive rather than neutral, subjective E will be 
lower and subjective P will be higher. Analogously, when affect is negative rather 
than neutral, subjective E will be higher and subjective P will be lower. 
These relationships are represented graphically in Figure 6.  The vertical axis 
represents E and P on a scale ranging from 1 to 5, and the horizontal axis shows negative, 
neutral, and positive levels of affect.  The graph indicates that, as affect increases from 
negative to positive, subjective E decreases while subjective P increases. These 
relationships represent attempts to increase subjective P-E fit as affect moves from negative 
to neutral to positive. 
When E is less than P.  We now consider the case where E is less than P. In 
this case, when affect shifts from neutral to positive, subjective E will increase and 
subjective P will decrease, thereby increasing subjective P-E fit.  These adjustments in 
subjective E and P are again in line with the affective consistency perspective’s assertion 
that people develop P-E fit cognitions that are consistent with their affective experiences.  
Since positive affect is consistent with P-E fit, people experiencing positive affect will 
subjectively adjust E and P toward P-E fit. Thus, allowing them to align E and P with their 
affective state. Conversely, when affect shifts from neutral to negative, subjective E will 
decrease and subjective P will increase, thereby decreasing subjective fit. Since negative 
affect is consistent with P-E misfit, people experiencing negative affect will try to align E 
and P with their affective state by subjectively adjusting E and P toward P-E misfit. These 
relationships lead us to the following hypothesis when E is less than P: 
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Hypothesis 1b. When affect is positive rather than neutral, subjective E will be 
higher and subjective P will be lower. Analogously, when affect is negative rather 
than neutral, subjective E will be lower and subjective P will be higher. 
 These relationships are again represented graphically in figure 7. According to this 
figure, as affect increases from negative to positive, subjective E increases while subjective 
P decreases. Thus, these relationships illustrate attempts at increasing subjective P-E fit 
when affect shifts from negative to neutral to positive. 
When E and P are equal.  Finally, when E and P are equal, affect shifting from 
neutral to positive will not influence E and P. Since P-E fit already exists, any adjustments 
to subjective E and P cannot bring them closer. In contrast, affect shifting from neutral to 
negative will result in attempts to create misfit between subjective E and P. This can occur 
through one of two processes. One process would involve increasing subjective E and 
decreasing subjective P, creating subjective P-E misfit in which E is greater than P.  An 
alternative process would entail decreasing E and increasing P, resulting in subjective P-E 
misfit where E is less than P.  If we assume these two processes are equally likely to occur, 
then their effects on subjective E and P will cancel each other out on average, such that 
negative affect has no net effect on subjective E and P.  Hence, the following hypotheses 
apply when E and P are equal: 
Hypothesis 1c. When affect is positive rather than neutral, subjective E and P will 
remain unchanged. Analogously, when affect is negative rather than neutral, 
subjective E and P will also remain unchanged. 
Figure 8 depicts these relationships graphically. Lines E1 and P1 depict the scenario 
when affect shifts from neutral to negative where E increases and P is decreases. Similarly, 
56 
 
  
lines P1 and E2 illustrate the scenario under the same affect shift where E decreases and P 
increases instead. The net effect of these two relationships is represented by line E P. In all, 
the graph shows that E and P are unchanged when affect shifts from negative to neutral to 
positive. Table 1 summarizes hypothesized relationships based on the affective consistency 
perspective. 
Hedonistic perspective 
The hedonistic perspective argues that subjective E and P will be adjusted in ways 
that increase P-E fit when work-based affect is negative. This perspective also implies that 
positive work-based affect would not induce any action on E and P because hedonistic 
processes are triggered only by the experience of negative affect. Therefore, people already 
experiencing positive affect would have no incentive to change either E or P. Like the case 
of affective consistency relationships, this perspective involves three types of relationships 
linking affect to E and P that depend on whether E is greater than P, E is less than P, or E 
and P are equal. 
When E is greater than P.  In this case, when affect shifts from neutral to 
positive, subjective E will and P will not change, thereby also leaving subjective P-E fit 
unchanged. This non-effect is explained by the core premise of the hedonistic perspective, 
which asserts that people only adjust cognitions in response to negative affective 
experiences. Because people experiencing positive affect have no incentive to act upon 
their current circumstances, they will not change subjective E and P, thereby leaving P-E fit 
unchanged. Conversely, when affect shifts from neutral to negative, subjective E will 
decrease and subjective P will increase, thereby increasing subjective P-E fit. According to 
the hedonistic perspective, people seek to deal with negative affective experiences by 
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adjusting their cognitions so as to achieve subjective P-E fit. Therefore, people 
experiencing negative affect will subjectively skew E and P toward P-E fit. Hence, we have 
the following hypothesis when E is greater than P: 
Hypothesis 2a. When affect is positive rather than neutral, subjective E and P will 
remain unchanged. Analogously, when affect is negative rather than neutral, 
subjective E will be lower and subjective P will be higher. 
These relationships are represented graphically in figure 9.  The graph indicates 
that, as work-based affect increases from neutral to positive, there is no change in E and P. 
Hence, affect has no effect on P-E fit when positive affect is experienced. In contrast, when 
affect decreases from neutral to negative, subjective E decreases and subjective P increases. 
This latter relationship represents attempts to increase subjective P-E fit as affect moves 
from neutral to negative. 
When E is less than P.  Since the hedonistic perspective states that people are 
only motivated to adjust cognitions when experiencing negative affect, subjective E and P 
will remain unchanged when affect shifts from neutral to positive. In contrast, when affect 
shifts from neutral to negative, subjective E will increase and subjective P will decrease, 
thereby increasing subjective fit. These changes in E and P signify attempts to adjust 
cognitions to achieve P-E fit when negative affect is experienced. Therefore, we have the 
following hypothesis when E is less than P: 
Hypothesis 2b. When affect is positive rather than neutral, subjective E and P will 
remain unchanged. Analogously, when affect is negative rather than neutral, 
subjective E will be higher and subjective P will be lower. 
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These relationships are illustrated graphically in figures 18 to 20. As can be seen in 
the figure, E and P do not change as work-based affect increases from neutral to positive. 
This occurrence depicts a case where affect has no effect on P-E fit. On the other hand, 
when affect decreases from neutral to negative, subjective E increases and subjective P 
decreases. This latter relationship represents attempts to bring E and P in line and increase 
subjective P-E fit. 
When E is equal to P.   Lastly, when E is equal to P and affect shifts from 
neutral to positive, subjective E and P will not change. The reason for this relationship 
again lies in the hedonistic perspective’s stance that people already experiencing positive 
affect have no incentive to change their current situation. Similarly, when affect shifts from 
neutral to negative, subjective E and P will also not change. This relationship occurs 
because any adjustments to E and P cannot increase subjective P-E fit any further as P-E fit 
already exists. Thus we have the following hypothesis when E is equal to P: 
Hypothesis 2c. When affect is positive rather than neutral, subjective E and P will 
remain unchanged. Analogously, when affect is negative rather than neutral, 
subjective E and P will also remain unchanged. 
These relationships are represented graphically in figure7c. The graph indicates 
that, as affect increases from negative to neutral to positive, there is no change in E and P. 
Table 2 summarizes hypotheses on the relationships between affect and subjective E and P 
proposed by the hedonistic perspective. 
Relationships between E and P and affective work attitudes 
 For the relationships describing the effect of E and P on affective work attitudes 
(e.g. job satisfaction), it is assumed that work attitudes are maximized when subjective E 
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and P are equal, signifying subjective P-E fit. Once again, the effects of subjective E and P 
on work attitudes (e.g. job satisfaction) depend on whether E is greater than P, E is less 
than P, or E is equal to P. 
 When E is less than P.  When E is less than P, the environment is perceived 
to provide supplies (E) that are inadequate or less than what the individual needs (P). 
Hence, increasing E increases P-E fit. This gives rise to a situation where individual needs 
are increasingly being fulfilled by the environment, hence leading to attitudinal outcomes 
that are increasingly positive (French, Caplan & Harrison, 1982; Edwards et al., 1998). 
Similarly, as P decreases, individual needs are increasingly being brought in line with 
current levels of E. This also leads to an increase in subjective P-E fit, which in turn 
increases work attitudes. Thus, we have the following hypotheses when E is less than P:  
Hypothesis 3a. When E is less than P, affective work attitudes increase as E 
increases or P decreases. 
 When E is greater than P.   According to P-E fit theory, there are actually 
three possible relationships that could exist when E exceeds P. Specifically, work attitudes 
could remain constant, increase, or decrease as E exceeds P. Which of these three 
relationships prevails is determined by the implications of excess supplies (E) for a 
particular job dimension on need fulfillment on other dimensions (Edwards et al., 1998). 
First, attitudes could remain constant as E exceeds P when excess E does not influence 
need fulfillment on other job dimensions. An example of this relationship exists when once 
employee benefits like health insurance are able to meet one’s needs for health care costs, 
excess benefits of this kind would have little effect on need fulfillment on other 
dimensions. Hence, work attitudes remain unchanged beyond this satiation point. Next, 
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attitudes could also increase as E exceeds P when excess supplies on one dimension are 
used to fulfill needs on other dimensions. For instance, excess authority in one’s job may 
present opportunities to put into effect changes in other areas of one’s job, which can in 
turn fulfill other needs such as autonomy and variety. Lastly, attitudes can also decrease as 
E exceeds P when excess supplies on one dimension hamper the ability to fulfill needs on 
others. For instance, too much autonomy over one’s work may interfere with one’s need for 
guidance and supervision. 
 Drawing from ideas offered by the third set of relationships when E exceeds P, I 
chose to examine job dimensions which exhibit parabolic P-E fit relationships with work 
attitudes because they are consistent with the prevalent notion across fit research that 
outcomes are maximized only when P-E fit exists. Hence, excess E over P is associated 
with decreasing work attitudes on the dimensions that I have chosen3. Table 3 provides 
examples of how and why parabolic relationships can play out with respect to the three job 
facets that I am analyzing. 
 Considering the three job facets of interest, when E is greater than P, increasing 
subjective E creates a situation where environmental supplies (E) progressively exceed 
individual needs (P). As explained in table 3, we should expect work attitudes to decrease 
when environment supplies exceed individual needs. It thus follows that increasing 
environmental supplies when E is already greater than P exacerbates P-E misfit and 
decreases work attitudes. Similarly, decreasing P when E is greater than P can also decrease 
work attitudes. This relationship exists because decreasing P when E already exceeds P 
worsens P-E fit by driving E and P further apart. As subjective P-E fit decreases, work 
attitudes decrease accordingly. We are thus left with the following hypothesis: 
                                                 
3 Figure 3 contains a graphical representation of this relationship. 
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Hypothesis 3b. When E is greater than P, affective work attitudes decrease as E 
increases or P decreases. 
Table 4 summarizes the hypotheses about relationships between E and P and 
affective work attitudes. 
These relationships are represented graphically in figure 12.  The vertical axis 
represents work attitudes on a scale ranging from 1 to 5, and the horizontal axes shows E 
and P on scale ranging from 1 to 5.  The graph indicates that affective work attitudes 
increase as E and P converge. 
Study context 
 The current experimental study was set within a job search paradigm. Participants 
from an undergraduate subject pool were guided through a series of activities that were 
designed to study attitudes toward jobs that were similar to those that they would apply to. 
Person-environment (P-E) fit was conceptualized as needs-supplies fit (Cable & Edwards, 
2004), where fit was analyzed between what an individual wants in a job (P) and what is 
offered by a particular job (E). 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
METHOD 
Data Sample  
One-hundred and fifty undergraduate business students from a large university in 
the Southeastern United States participated in this study. Participants were enrolled in an 
undergraduate organizational behavior class and were awarded credit for their participation. 
Participants were reasonably involved in the job search process with 35.3% reporting that 
they were currently searching for a job, and 45.3% reporting that they were searching for 
an internship. 
Statistical Power 
  To ensure that the above number of participants were sufficient for this study, a 
statistical power analyses was conducted. For these analyses, I used data that was gathered 
from a previous research project on P-E fit by J. R. Edwards. Even though this data was 
gathered in a field setting, it contained variables that were similar to those that are involved 
in the current study such as perceived job preferences (subjective P), perceived job 
environment (subjective E), and job satisfaction. Since work-based affect was not 
specifically assessed as variable in this data set, job satisfaction was treated as a measure of 
generalized work-based affect. This assumption is reasonable because it is consistent with 
Locke’s (1969) definition of job satisfaction as the affective reaction towards one’s job 
(Locke, 1969). There is also considerable support for the view that job satisfaction contains 
a sizable affective component (Brief & Weiss, 2002). 
 
 
  
In order to obtain effect sizes in the form of multiple correlations (R2), I ran 
regression analyses based on models that resembled those that were to be analyzed in the 
current project. Specifically, models depicting the effect of work-based affect (job 
satisfaction) on subjective E, and the effect of work-based affect on subjective P were 
examined. Average R2 effect sizes from these models were .24 and .08 for subjective E and 
P respectively. These effect sizes were then used to estimate the number of participants that 
would be required to obtain an acceptable statistical power value of .80. Using a power 
calculator software program (Lenth, 2006), results indicated that the minimum number of 
participants required for power of at least .80 was 41and 127 for subjective E and P 
respectively. Since the current sample size of 150 for each trial exceeds the minimum 
requirements for adequate statistical power, this study had enough power to detect any 
hypothesized effects.  
Procedure  
 This present study was conducted in an experiment setting using a computerized 
experiment software program (i.e. MediaLab). Participants were told that they were part of 
a study to investigate the effectiveness of a system called the Job Information System (JIS), 
a new system whose goal is to understand how job seekers respond to different types of 
job-related information. They were also told that the information gathered from this study 
would be used to help job seekers find suitable jobs where they would be successful. 
 Overview.  The current study employed a 3 x 3 mixed factorial design in which 
work-based affect was manipulated as a between-person factor, while the objective job 
environment (E) was manipulated as a within-person factor. In the first step of the study, 
participants were induced with positive, negative, or neutral levels of work-based affect. 
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This affect induction was followed by the presentation of manipulated information on a 
hypothetical job. Finally, perceptions of the subjective job environment (E) (e.g. the 
amount of autonomy that was present in the job), personal job preferences (subjective P), 
and attitudes (e.g. intent to apply and anticipated satisfaction) toward the featured job were 
assessed. Since job information was manipulated as a within-person factor, participants 
received information on three different hypothetical jobs, each containing different levels 
of manipulated information on the job environment. In order to prevent induced affect from 
dissipating, each objective E manipulation was preceded by an affect induction. Therefore 
the three experimental steps: First the manipulation of affect, then the manipulation of 
objective E, and finally the assessment of job perceptions, personal preferences, and 
attitudes were repeated for each of three different hypothetical jobs. The following sections 
discuss these three experimental steps in more detail.  
 Affect manipulation.   Participants began each study phase by reading a 
fictitious research report designed to induce positive, negative, or neutral affect about their 
own future job prospects. Affect was manipulated as a between-subject factor, so each 
individual participant received reports that were consistently all positive, all negative, or all 
neutral. Reports presented manipulated information about the relative standing of the 
participants’ school compared to other schools in job-related areas such as earnings of 
graduates, career success (i.e. number of promotions and career satisfaction) of graduates, 
and school reputation among employers. Participants in positive affect conditions were 
presented with information that suggests that their school compares favorably against other 
schools, while participants in the negative affect condition were presented with information 
suggesting that their school compares poorly against other schools. Those in the neutral 
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condition read reports on irrelevant topics such as research projects that their school was 
involved in. After reading each article, participants were asked several questions regarding 
their feelings about their career prospects. These questions served as measures of work-
based affect. 
 Job environment manipulation.  The objective job environment was 
manipulated by providing participants with information on various hypothetical jobs. This 
manipulation is based on a social information processing paradigm (Salancik & Pfeffer, 
1978), which posits that perceptions of jobs are influenced by social cues provided by 
sources from within a particular job environment (Weiss & Shaw, 1979; White & Mitchell, 
1979). Participants were shown sets of fictitious comments from incumbents in three 
hypothetical jobs. They were told that these comments are from actual employees who are 
currently in these jobs, and were then asked to read through the comments because the 
experimenters were interested to know how they perceived certain aspects of these jobs. 
These job comments were actually designed to provide and manipulate information on 
certain job facets such as the amount of autonomy and variety present in the job, or the 
degree to which the job requires supervising other people’s work. Thus, information on job 
facets were manipulated as a within-person factor, creating three different jobs that were 
supposedly high, moderate, or low in facets of variety, span of control, and autonomy. To 
convey information about these job facets, comments describing each featured job 
presented information about job responsibilities (i.e. assembling spreadsheets and 
analyzing financial information), work activities (i.e. communicating with peers and 
supervisors via telephone or in person), and the overall work environment (i.e. “It is very 
important to work with others in a team in the job”). For instance, a manipulation for a job 
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to be high in variety included comments describing various aspects of the job that appear to 
evidence undertaking many different roles and activities (e.g. “We are constantly being 
assigned to multiple projects simultaneously”).  
To prevent confounds that might arise from order effects, a 3 X 3 Latin square 
(since there are 3 job facets being manipulated) was used to counterbalance the order in 
which information on the manipulated job facets was presented. Furthermore, manipulated 
job information on these three job facets were also presented together with filler 
information on other job facets such as security and altruism, so as to prevent participants 
form focusing too much on the manipulated dimensions, and to also make information on 
each featured job seem more comprehensive. The rationale behind the choosing of which 
job facets to manipulate, and which to use as filler information, is discussed in the 
“measures” section. Finally, to keep participants engaged in this exercise, we promised to 
reveal the identities of these jobs at the end of the study. Appendix A displays comments 
describing the three hypothetical jobs featured in this section. 
 Measurement.  After having read information on a hypothetical job, 
participants were assessed on their perceptions of the job (subjective E), and their own 
personal job preferences (subjective P). In addition, participants also provided information 
on their attitudes toward the featured job. Attitudes that were assessed included projected 
job satisfaction (i.e. if they were an employee in that job), projected turnover intent (i.e. if 
they were an employee in that job), interest in applying for that job, overall perceptions of 
fit with the job, and satisfaction with autonomy, span of control, and variety facets of the 
job. 
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 Pre-testing.  This study was pre-tested to ensure that the manipulations and the 
experiment sequences worked as planned. Participants for this pre-testing exercise came 
from a different group of students at the same university where this study was conducted. 
Measures 
 Work-based affect.  Work-based affect was measured using affect markers from 
Russell’s (1980) circumplex model of affect. After reading each affect-inducing article, 
participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they were experiencing certain 
positive (i.e. happy, glad, delighted, satisfied, and pleased) and negative (i.e. miserable, 
frustrated, distressed, sad, and gloomy) emotions at the particular moment. Ratings were 
obtained using a 5-point Likert scale. These items were first rescaled to correspond to an 
overall affect scale that ranged from -4 to +4, where negative scores implied the experience 
of negative affect, positive scores represented the experience of positive affect, and the 
value 0 represented neutral affect. Scores from the ten emotions were then averaged to 
obtain an overall measure of work-based affect.    
Job facets.   The job environment was manipulated and measured on several 
different job facets that were prominent in past research on job design and work values 
(Cable & Edwards, 2004; Gay, Weiss, Hendel, Dawis & Lofquist, 1971; Hackman & 
Lawler, 1971; Pryor, 1983; Super, 1970). In order to ensure that all job facets involved in 
this study did not overlap too much with each other, previously unpublished data from J.R. 
Edwards on the Minnesota Importance Questionnaire (MIQ), Work Aspect Preference 
Scale (WAPS), and the Work Values Inventory (WVI) was first checked to ensure that 
correlations between these facets were not exceedingly high. Results from this check 
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revealed that all chosen facets were only modestly related with one another with the 
average correlation between them being .21.  
In accordance with hypotheses 3, job facets that were both manipulated and 
measured were also chosen based on their expected relationships with affective work 
attitude outcomes such as job satisfaction. Specifically, facets where it could be reasonably 
assumed that outcomes were maximized when attributes of the environment (E) matched 
those of the person (P) were chosen. This process resulted in the selection of the three 
facets of autonomy, span of control (i.e. opportunities to manage people), and variety as 
variables that were first manipulated and then measured in this study. Consistent with a 
needs-supplies fit paradigm, subjective job environment (E) ratings were obtained by 
asking how much of a particular facet (e.g. “doing a variety of things”) was present in the 
featured job. Similarly, ratings of person needs (P) were obtained by asking how much of 
the particular job facet the respondent would like to have. Ratings of E and P were obtained 
using a 7-point Likert scale which ranged from 1(“none at all”) to 7 (“a very great 
amount”). The exact items used to measure job facets are displayed in appendix B. 
Job attitudes.   Four different job outcomes were assessed. Keeping in line 
with the above cover story, participants were asked to rate each featured job by indicating 
their intent to apply, anticipated job and facet satisfaction, anticipated perceived needs-
supplies fit, and anticipated turnover intent. Intent to apply (“I plan to exert a great deal of 
effort to get this job.” ), anticipated job satisfaction (“In general, I would be satisfied with 
this job.”), facet satisfaction , and anticipated turnover intent ( “I could see myself working 
in this job for many years.” ) were measured using scales from (Edwards et al., 2006), 
whereas anticipated needs-supplies fit was measured using Cable and DeRue’s (2002) 
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perceived needs-supplies fit measure (“There is a good fit between what this job offers and 
what I am looking for in a job.” ). Ratings of these job outcomes were obtained using a 7-
point Likert scale. 
 Individual differences. For supplemental analyses, several individual difference 
measures were also assessed approximately six weeks prior to the study.  Positive and 
negative affectivity was assessed using the PANAS (Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988). 
Consistent with the measure used by Watson and colleagues (1988), ratings on this measure 
were obtained via a 5-point scale. Preference for consistency was assessed using the brief 
version of Cialdini et al’s (1995), which consisted of 9 items. Lastly, self-esteem was 
assessed using Rosenberg’s (1965) 10-item scale. Measures of self-esteem and preference 
for consistency were obtained using a 7-point Likert scale. 
Analyses 
 Hypotheses 1 and 2.   Hypotheses 1 and 2 deal with relationships between 
work-based affect and subjective E and P respectively. As highlighted during the 
hypotheses development, these relationships are dependent on the relative levels of E and 
P. Hence the general regression model used for these analyses is: 
E = b0 + b1A + b2W1 + b3AW1 + b4W2 + b5AW2 + b6ED1 + b7ED2 + e (1) 
P = b0 + b1A + b2W1 + b3AW1 + b4W2 + b5AW2 + e    (2) 
where work-based affect is represented by A, and the two categorical variables W1 and W2 
have been created to represent three distinct groups of relative E and P (E > P, E = P, and E 
< P) that correspond to the hypotheses to be tested. The objective environment is also 
controlled for by including ED1 and ED2, which are dummy variables denoting the 
objective environment manipulation groups, in the model. Note that since this study was 
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unable to manipulate the objective person construct4, equation 2 did not control for the 
objective person. 
 A closer look at the simple slope equations illustrates how the above models 
facilitate the analysis of relationships between work-based affect and E and P for different 
groups of responses. If we let the omitted group be E < P, then W1 = 0 and W2 = 0 when E 
< P. Hence, the equation relating affect to E when E < P is: 
  E = b0 + b1A + b6ED1 + b7ED2 + e    (3) 
Similarly, when E > P and W1 = 0, W2 = 1, the equation relating affect and E is: 
E = (b0 + b4) + (b1 + b5)A + b6ED1 + b7ED2 + e  (4) 
Lastly, when E = P and W1 = 1, W2 = 0, the equation relating affect and E becomes: 
  E = (b0 + b2) + (b1 + b3)A + b6ED1 + b7ED2 + e  (5) 
Exactly the same relationships hold between affect and P, when P is the dependent variable 
in the above models.  
Hypotheses 1 and 2 also predict different relationships when it comes to different 
levels of affect. For instance, hypothesis 2(a) states that “when affect is positive rather than 
neutral, subjective E and P will remain unchanged”, whereas “when affect is negative 
rather than neutral, subjective E will be lower and subjective P will be higher.” This 
hypothesis implies the presence of non-linear relationships between affect and E and P that 
are illustrated in the figures 7a and 7b. Therefore, an additional dummy variable (D) is 
required to model the non-linear relationships that are being proposed. Specifically, if we 
                                                 
4 Earlier designs of this study proposed manipulating personal job facet preferences via feedback on a bogus 
questionnaire. This plan was dropped because pre-testing results suggested that participants were generally 
suspicious about this manipulation procedure. Pre-testing results confirm this claim by suggesting that there 
were no meaningful differences between participants in different experimental conditions that attempted to 
manipulate P. 
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let A* denote a neutral level of affect5, and assign D to be a dummy variable that equals 0 
when A ≤ A*, and to equals 1 when A > A*, incorporating D into equations 1 and 2 
produces: 
E = b0 + b1A + b2AD + b3W1 + b4AW1 + b5ADW1  
+ b6W2 + b7AW2 + b8ADW2 + b9ED1 + b10ED2 + e  (6) 
P = b0 + b1A + b2AD + b3W1 + b4AW1 + b5ADW1  
+ b6W2 + b7AW2 + b8ADW2 + e     (7) 
The relationships between affect and the respective E and P outcomes are again more 
apparent when we look at the respective simple slopes for the different E relative to P 
groups.  
When E exceeds P.  When E > P (W1 = 0, W2 = 1), the equations relating affect 
and E and P are: 
E = (b0 + b6) + (b1 + b7)A +  (b2 + b8)AD + b9ED1 + b10ED2 + e (8) 
P = (b0 + b6) + (b1 + b7)A +  (b2 + b8)AD + e    (9) 
Furthermore, when affect is negative compared to the neutral level and A ≤ A* (D = 0), the 
above equations simplify to: 
E = (b0 + b6) + (b1 + b7)A + b9ED1 + b10ED2 + e  (10) 
P = (b0 + b6) + (b1 + b7)A + e     (11) 
Therefore, to test the affective-consistency hypothesis that E will be higher when 
affect is negative rather than neutral (H1a) is to test whether (b1 + b7) is negative in 
                                                 
5 For this study, the average level of affect for participants in the neutral affect manipulation condition was 
treated as the neutral value of affect. Thus the neutral affect value was .73 on a scale that ranged from -4 to 
+4. Since a value of “0” lies exactly at the midpoint of the 9-point affect scale, “0” could also logically 
represent a feasible value of neutral affect. Thus, all relevant analyses were repeated with “0” used as the 
neutral value of affect. Results from this latter set of analyses revealed few noticeable differences when 
compared to the original set of analyses. 
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equation 10. Similarly, to test the hedonistic hypothesis that E will be lower when affect is 
negative rather than neutral (H2a) is to test whether (b1 + b7) is positive in equation 10. 
Correspondingly, to test the affective-consistency hypothesis that P will be lower when 
affect is negative rather than neutral (H1a) is to test whether (b1 + b7) is positive in equation 
11. On the other hand, testing the hypothesis that P will be higher when affect is negative 
rather than neutral (H2a) involves testing whether (b1 + b7) is negative in equation 11. 
 Conversely, when affect is positive compared to the neutral level and A > A* (D = 
1) equations 8 and 9 become: 
E = (b0 + b6) + (b1 + b7 + b2 + b8)A + b9ED1 + b10ED2 + e (12)  
P = (b0 + b6) + (b1 + b7 + b2 + b8)A + e   (13) 
 Hence, when affect is positive compared to the neutral level, testing the affective-
consistency hypothesis that E will be lower when affect is positive (H1a) is to test whether 
(b1 + b7 + b2 + b8) is negative in equation 12. Similarly, to test the hedonistic hypothesis 
that E will remain unchanged when affect is positive rather than neutral (H2a) is to test 
whether (b1 + b7 + b2 + b8) is 0 in the same model. Likewise, testing the affective-
consistency hypothesis that P will be higher when affect is positive rather than neutral 
(H1a) is to test whether (b1 + b7 + b2 + b8) is positive in equation 13. Similarly, testing the 
hedonistic hypothesis that P will remain unchanged when affect is positive rather than 
neutral (H2a) is to test whether (b1 + b7 + b2 + b8) is 0 in equation 13. 
 When E is equal to P.   When E is equal to P (W1 = 1, W2 = 0), equations 6 
and 7 reduce to: 
E = (b0 + b3) + (b1 + b4)A +  (b2 + b5)AD + b9ED1 + b10ED2 + e (14) 
P = (b0 + b3) + (b1 + b4)A +  (b2 + b5)AD + e    (15) 
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When affect is negative and A ≤ A* (D = 0) the models depicting the relationship between 
affect and E and P respectively become: 
E = (b0 + b3) + (b1 + b4)A + b9ED1 + b10ED2 + e  (16) 
P = (b0 + b3) + (b1 + b4)A + e     (17) 
Consequently, to test whether E and P will remain unchanged when affect is negative rather 
than neutral (H1c & H2c) is to test whether (b1 + b4) is 0. On the other hand, when affect is 
positive rather than neutral and A > A* (D = 1), equations 14 and 15 simplify to: 
E = (b0 + b3) + (b1 + b4 + b2 + b5)A + b9ED1 + b10ED2 + e (18) 
P = (b0 + b3) + (b1 + b4 + b2 + b5)A + e   (19) 
Ergo, testing the hypothesis that E and P will remain unchanged when affect is positive 
rather than neutral (H1c & H2c) requires testing whether (b1 + b4 + b2 + b5) is 0. 
 When E is less than P.  When E is less than P (W1 = 0, W2 = 0), equations 6 
and 7 become: 
E = b0 + b1A + b2AD + b9ED1 + b10ED2 + e   (20) 
P = b0 + b1A + b2AD + e     (21) 
When affect is negative compared the neutral value and A ≤ A* (D = 0), the equations 
relating affect and E and P are: 
E = b0 + b1A + b9ED1 + b10ED2 + e    (22) 
P = b0 + b1A + e      (23) 
Therefore, to test the affective-consistency hypothesis that E will be lower when affect is 
negative rather than neutral (H1b) is to test whether b1 is positive in equation 22. Similarly, 
to test the hedonistic hypothesis that E will be higher when affect is negative rather than 
neutral (H2b) is to test whether b1 is negative in equation 22. Correspondingly, to test the 
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affective-consistency hypothesis that P will be higher when affect is negative rather than 
neutral (H1b) is to test whether b1 is negative in equation 22. Similarly, to test the 
hedonistic hypothesis that P will be lower when affect is negative rather than neutral (H2b) 
is to test whether b1 is positive in equation 22. 
However, when affect is positive compared to the neutral level and A > A* (D = 1) 
equations 20 and 21reduce to: 
E = b0 + (b1 + b2)A + b9ED1 + b10ED2 + e   (24) 
P = b0 + (b1 + b2)A + e     (25) 
In this case, to test whether E will be higher when affect is positive rather than neutral 
(H1b) is to test whether (b1 + b2) is positive. In contrast, to test whether E will remain 
unchanged when affect is positive rather than neutral is to test whether (b1 + b2) is 0 (H2b). 
Similarly, to test whether P will be lower when affect is positive rather than neutral (H1b) 
is to test whether (b1 + b2) is negative. In contrast, to test whether P will remain unchanged 
when affect is positive rather than neutral is to test whether (b1 + b2) is 0 (H2b). 
Accounting for nested data structure.  Since measures of affect, E, and P 
were obtained three times repeatedly for each participant, the current data set had a nested 
structure where repeated measures of affect, E, and P were nested within each participant. 
To account for the possible non-independence of observations, multilevel random 
coefficient (MRC) models (also known as hierarchical linear models) were employed in the 
current analyses (Bliese, 2002; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Hofmann, Griffin & Gavin, 
2000). Hence, the general regression model represented by equations 6 and 7 was adapted 
to produce the following MRC model represented by level 1 and level 2 equations: 
Level 1: 
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   E = b0 + b1W1 + b2W2 + b3ED1 + b4ED2 + r  (26) 
Level 2: 
   b0 = γ00 + γ01A + γ02AD + μ0    (27) 
b1 = γ10 + γ11A + γ12AD + μ1    (28) 
b2 = γ20 + γ21A + γ22AD + μ2    (29) 
b3 = γ30      (30) 
b4 = γ40      (31) 
The MRC model above takes into account the nested nature of the current dataset 
by allowing average levels of E (represented by b0), and the relationships between different 
E-P groups and E (represented by b1 and b2) to vary both within and across individuals. 
These effects are reflected in the above model by modeling coefficients b0, b1, and b2 in the 
level 2 model as random coefficients with both fixed effects (γ) (i.e. a parameter estimate 
that does not vary across individuals), and random effects (μ) whose variance represents 
between individual variance in the coefficient. Affect (A) and affect group (D) were 
conceptualized as level 2 variables since individuals were placed in manipulation groups 
that consistently received articles of the same valence (i.e. positive, negative, or neutral). 
Therefore, A and D were variables that were supposed to remain constant within 
individuals.  
In contrast, variables W1 and W2, which serve classification variables for different 
groups involving relative levels of E and P (i.e. E >P, E = P, and E < P) were modeled as  
level 1 variables because they are variables that were allowed to vary within individuals. 
Similarly, ED1 and ED2 were also modeled as level 1variables since they are dummy 
variables controlling for the manipulated objective environment, which was also varied 
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within individuals. There was no random variance component in equations 30 and 31 
because each individual received the same combination of the objective E manipulation. 
Substituting equations 27 to 31 into equation 26 yields the following reduced form 
equation: 
E = (γ00 + γ01A + γ02AD + γ10W1 + γ11AW1+ γ12ADW1+ γ20W2 + γ21AW2 + γ22ADW2 
+ γ30ED1 + γ40ED2) + (μ0 + W1μ1+ W2μ2 + r)   (32) 
where the terms in the first parentheses denote fixed effects, while the terms in the second 
parentheses denote random effects in the MRC model. Comparing equations 6 and 32 it 
should be apparent that the fixed effects coefficients γ00, γ01, γ02, γ10, γ11, γ12, γ20, γ21, γ22, γ30, 
and γ40, correspond to coefficients b0 to b10 in equation 6 respectively. Hence, significance 
tests on the fixed effects coefficients were used to evaluate support for hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Additionally, linear contrast statements were used in the SAS PROC MIXED program to 
conduct significance tests for hypotheses such as H2a, which involve linear combinations 
of coefficients (i.e. b1 + b7). 
 Hypotheses 3.   Unlike hypotheses 1 and 2, hypothesis 3 is concerned with 
relationships between subjective E and P and work attitudes such as job and facet 
satisfaction, intent to apply, turnover intent, and perceived needs-supplies fit. Polynomial 
regression modeling was adopted as an analytical framework for hypothesis 3 (Edwards, 
1995; Edwards & Parry, 1993). Based on this framework, the proposed functional form for 
the model of P-G fit is represented as: 
Z = b0 + b1E + b2P + b3E2 + b4EP + b5P2 + e   (33) 
where E represents subjective E, P represents subjective P, and Z is the predicted individual 
outcome. To take into account the nested nature of data, the present analyses incorporate 
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the polynomial regression in equation 33 within a multilevel random coefficient (MRC) 
model (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Hofmann et al., 2000; Jansen & Kristof-Brown, 2005). 
The set of random coefficient equations based on equation 33 are as follows: 
Level 1 equation: 
 Z = b0 + b1E + b3E2 + r     (34)  
Level 2 equations: 
b0 = γ00 + γ01P + γ02P2+ μ0,     (35) 
b1 = γ10 + γ11P + μ1,      (36) 
b2 = γ20 + μ2,       (37) 
The MRC model above takes into account the nested nature of the current dataset 
by allowing average levels of the job outcome Z (represented by b0), and the relationships 
between E and Z (represented by b1 and b2) to vary both within and across individuals. 
These effects are reflected in the above model by modeling coefficients b0, b1, and b2 in the 
level 2 model as a random coefficient with both fixed effects (γ) (i.e. a parameter estimate 
that does not vary across groups), and random effects (μ) whose variance represents 
between group variance in the coefficient. The subjective person (P) was conceptualized as 
a level 2 variable since ratings of P should not vary within the same individual. In contrast, 
the variable E was modeled as a level 1 variable because it is a variable that was 
manipulated and allowed to vary within individuals.  
Consistent with previous fit research using polynomial regression modeling and 
HLM (Jansen & Kristof-Brown, 2005), analyses of P-E fit relationships predicted in 
hypotheses 3(a) to 3(c) were conducted by using response surface methodology (Edwards 
& Parry, 1993). Specifically, the significance of slopes and curvatures along lines of 
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interest such as E=P and E=-P were tested using linear contrasts in the SAS PROC MIXED 
program. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 8 
RESULTS 
Pre-testing 
 Results from pre-testing suggested that research reports successfully influenced 
how participants felt about their job prospects. To account for the nested nature of the data, 
manipulation checks were performed in a hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) framework. 
Results indicated that participants in the three affect manipulation conditions differed 
significantly on how they felt about their career prospects (F = 60.18, p < .01). Pairwise 
comparisons suggest that participants who received reports containing positive information 
felt significantly more positively about their career prospects compared to those who read 
reports containing neutral (p < .01) and negative information (p < .01). Correspondingly, 
those who read reports containing negative information also felt significantly more 
negative (p < .01) about their career prospects than participants who read neutral and 
positive reports respectively (p < .01). Tables 5 and 6 display the means and results from 
pairwise tests of differences between means.  
 Results report in tables 7 and 8 also confirmed that manipulated information 
regarding job facets influenced how participants perceived almost all of the job facets that 
were featured in the study.6  Participants who read information suggesting that jobs were 
high in the manipulated facets (i.e. autonomy and span of control) perceived that jobs 
                                                 
6 The exception to this was the difference between groups that received moderate versus low levels of variety. 
To deal with this in the main study, wording of the job comments for these groups were slightly adjusted to 
emphasize the difference between moderate and low levels of variety in the featured jobs. Results from 
manipulation tests in the main study suggested that these adjustments were successful.  
 
 
  
contained higher amounts of these facets compared to participants who read information 
suggesting moderate or low levels on the facets. Similarly, participants who received 
information describing moderate levels of the job facets also perceived that the jobs 
contained higher amounts of these facets compared to those who received information 
describing low levels of these facets. Overall, pre-testing participants indicated that their 
experiment experiences did not cause them to be suspicious about the overall goals of the 
study. 
Main study 
 Manipulation checks.  As in the case of pre-testing, manipulation checks 
suggest that affect manipulations successfully influenced how participants felt about their 
job prospects. HLM analyses were again used to account for the nested structure of the 
data. Results confirmed that participants in the three affect manipulation conditions differed 
significantly on work-based affect and how they felt about their career prospects  (F = 
43.48, p < .01). Pairwise comparisons between manipulation groups indicated that 
participants who read reports that presented positive information felt significantly more 
positive about their career prospects compared to those who read reports containing neutral 
and negative information. Similarly, those who read reports containing negative 
information also felt significantly more negatively about their career prospects compared to 
participants who read neutral and positive reports respectively. Tables 9 and 10 display the 
means and results from pairwise comparisons of the difference in means across affect 
manipulation groups.  
 Manipulation checks also verified the success of manipulations on job 
environments. Manipulated information on job facets influenced participants’ perceptions 
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of the jobs that were featured in the study (i.e. p < .01 for omnibus tests for mean 
differences between groups on all job facets).  Participants who were presented with 
information suggesting that jobs were high in the manipulated facets (i.e. autonomy, span 
of control, and variety) perceived that jobs possessed higher levels of these facets compared 
to participants who read information that implied moderate or low levels on the facets. 
Likewise, participants who were given information describing moderate levels of the job 
facets also perceived that the jobs exhibited higher amounts of these facets compared to 
those who received information that described low levels of these facets. Tables 11 and 12 
respectively display means and results from pairwise comparisons of mean differences 
across manipulation groups. In all, results from these manipulation checks confirmed the 
success of manipulations employed in this study. 
 Correlations.  Table 13 displays the correlations between the measured 
variables in this study as well as indices of internal reliability of each of these measures. 
Notably, work-based affect did not seem to be significantly correlated with E and P. 
However, affect was significantly related with each of the four work overall outcomes that 
were assessed (i.e. intent to apply, job satisfaction, perceived needs-supplies fit, and 
turnover intent), and facet satisfaction pertaining to span of control. The implications of 
these results for the hypothesized relationships will now be discussed. 
 Hypotheses 1a and 2a.  Hypotheses 1a and 2a examine relationships based on 
the affective consistency and hedonistic perspectives respectively for the participant group 
where E exceeds P. Results from multilevel analyses of these relationships are displayed in 
tables 14 and 15. According to column 1 of table 15, there was little support for H1a and 
H2a for people who experienced negative affect. The only relationship that was supported 
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involved subjective P perceptions for variety, where people who experienced negative 
affect lowered the amount of variety that they wanted in their jobs. This observed 
relationship is in line with the affective-consistency prediction that people will adjust their 
perceived personal job wants toward P-E misfit in order to be consistent with the negative 
affect they experience.  
 H2a and hedonistic relationships were supported for participants who were 
experiencing positive affect (see column 2 of table 15). This support was evident for both E 
and P perceptions across all three job facets, except for the model relating affect and 
subjective E for span of control. Subjective E and P tended to remain unchanged when 
positive work-based affect was experienced. These results suggest that there was only 
support for the hedonistic perspective when positive work-based affect was experienced. 
  Hypotheses 1b and 2b.  As seen in column 3 in table 15, there was no support 
for H1b and H2b for participants where E is less than P, and who experienced negative 
work-based affect. In contrast H2b was supported for those who experienced positive 
affect. Individuals who experienced positive affect were not inclined to adjust either 
perceptions of subjective E or P. The results reported in column 4 of table 15 suggest that 
this tendency to not react to positive affect occurred across all three job facets, and for both 
E and P. In all, these results suggest that affect did not influence individuals’ perceptions of 
the subjective E and P when the job environment was perceived to offer less than what 
individuals wanted.  
 Hypotheses 1c and 2c.  According to column 5 in table 15, when E is equal to 
P and affect is negative rather than neutral, there is support for the hypothesis that E and P 
will remain unchanged across all job facets except for perceptions of subjective E for span 
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of control, which decreased in response to negative affect. This unexpected result suggests 
that individuals with P-E fit wanted less span of control in their jobs when they experienced 
negative affect. When affect was positive rather than neutral, the hypothesis that E and P 
will remain unchanged (H2b) was supported for the facet of variety.7 Similarly, there was 
also no change in P perceptions of span of control when positive affect was experienced. 
Counter to what was hypothesized, positive affect caused people to perceive that there was 
more autonomy and span of control in the featured jobs. Furthermore, people also wanted 
more autonomy when they experienced positive affect. In conclusion, while there is no 
clear support for either affective-consistency or hedonistic perspectives in this set of 
analyses. It also seems that people who were already experiencing fit between subjective E 
and P changed their perceptions of E and P on certain job facets. 
 Hypothesis 3.  Hypothesis 3 deals with the effect of P-E fit on work attitudes such 
as intent to apply, job and facet satisfaction, turnover intent, and perceived needs-supplies 
(N-S) fit. Response surface methodology (Edwards & Parry, 1993) was used to analyze the 
various P-E fit relationships that encompass this set of hypotheses8.  
 To establish support for a P-E fit effect (H3), the shape of the surface along the line 
of misfit (P = - E) was first evaluated by testing linear combinations of coefficients from 
their respective polynomial regression models using linear contrasts in SAS PROC 
MIXED. These analyses specifically focused on b3 – b4 + b5, which represents the surface 
                                                 
7 Analyses for H1 and H2 were repeated with positive and negative affect controlled for. Another set of 
analysis was based on data where responses were deleted from participants who strongly disagreed with the 
statements “The information presented in the reports influenced how I felt about my career prospects.” and 
“The featured job comments are effective at presenting information on the characteristics of Jobs A, B, and 
C.”, which resulted in responses from 19 participants being left out of the analyses. Results from these two 
sets of analyses yielded results that were not appreciably different from the results that are reported in this 
section.  
 
8 Plots of these response surfaces are displayed in figure 13 to 17. 
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curvature along the P = - E line, and b1 – b2, which represents the slope of the surface at the 
point E = 0, P = 09. For H3 to be supported, it first has to be established that b1 – b2 does 
not differ from zero which, in combination with a negative value for b3 – b4 + b5, indicates 
a symmetric downward curvature along the P = -E line centered at the point E = 0, P = 010. 
Second, it is also important to determine if the surface linking E and P to an individual 
outcome is rotated relative to the line of P-E fit (P = E) because a rotated surface implies 
that any support for P-E fit effect depends on absolute values of E and P (Edwards, 2007). 
Therefore, to test for surface rotation, analyses were repeated to see if the results obtained 
for surfaces along the P = -E line of misfit still applied at lower and higher levels of both E 
and P. The original data was first rescaled to low and high levels by respectively 
subtracting and adding 1 unit from the already scale-centered values of E and P. 
Polynomial regression models were then re-estimated, and the significance of b1 – b2 and b3 
– b4 + b5 was evaluated again for the rescaled data. If there were no differences in results 
obtained between the original and rescaled data (at low and high levels of E and P), then it 
may be concluded that there is no significant rotation, thus adding support to H3a and H3b. 
Conversely, if there are differences in results between the original and rescaled data, then it 
may be concluded that surfaces are rotated relative to the line of P-E fit, and that H3a and 
H3b are not supported. 
 Results from the polynomial regressions reported in table 16, while table 17 
displays results from the testing of linear combinations of coefficients. Columns 1 to 7 of 
table 17 indicate support for H3 for the relationships involving autonomy and all individual 
                                                 
9 For detailed discussions of response surface methodology see Edwards & Parry (1993) and Edwards (2002). 
 
10 Since we would expect that turnover intent be minimized when P-E fit exists, a positive value for b3 – b4 + 
b5 would be hypothesized instead of a negative one in the case of this dependent variable. 
85 
 
  
outcomes except for turnover intent. Therefore, when it was perceived that the amount of 
autonomy in a job environment (E) was less than the amount of autonomy that individuals 
would like to have (P), job satisfaction, facet satisfaction, intent to apply, and perceived 
needs-supplies (NS) fit all increased as E increased or P decreased. Similarly, when the 
perceived amount of autonomy (E) in a job was greater than the amount individuals would 
have liked (P), the same four outcomes decreased as E increased or P decreased. 
Summarizing, these results suggest that P-E fit effects were observed only for autonomy, 
and the individual outcomes of job satisfaction, facet satisfaction, intent to apply for the 
job, and perceived N-S fit.  
 As for span of control, results suggest the presence of significant downward 
curvature along the line of P-E misfit (denoted by b3 – b4 + b5) across all dependent 
variables. However, the slope of the surface (denoted by b1 – b2) was also significantly 
negative for job satisfaction, facet satisfaction, and intent to apply outcomes. This implies 
that these outcomes were not maximized at the point of P-E fit. Instead, they were 
maximized at a point where person wants exceeded what was offered by a featured job. 
Furthermore, the shape of the surfaces along the line of P-E misfit involving span of control 
were different when compared to results obtained when the models were re-estimated at 
low and high values of E and P. This finding indicates that all surfaces involving span of 
control were rotated relative to the line of P-E fit. For instance, there was no significant 
slope along the line of misfit for the surface linking span of control and turnover intent at 
the original moderate levels of E and P (figure 16). However, results in column 1 of table 
17 indicates that there is a negative slope along the line of misfit for low values of E and P, 
whereas corresponding numbers in column 5 signal the presence of a positive slope along 
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the line of misfit at high values of E and P. These comparisons point to a surface that is 
rotated relative to the line of P-E fit, and hence constitute evidence against the presence of 
a P-E fit effect.  
 Similar to results obtained for span of control, significant curvature along the line of 
P-E misfit was also observed across all outcomes for variety. Figures displayed in column 3 
of table 17 also point toward the presence of positive (facet satisfaction and turnover intent) 
and negative (job satisfaction, intent to apply, and perceived N-S fit) slopes along the line 
of misfit. These results are evidence against a P-E fit effect because they imply that 
outcomes were not maximized when there was P-E fit. Instead, facet satisfaction was 
maximized when the amount offered by a job exceeded individual wants. Correspondingly, 
job satisfaction, intent to apply, turnover intent, and perceived N-S fit were maximized (or 
minimized in the case of turnover intent) when individual wants exceeded what a particular 
job environment could offer. Furthermore, comparisons with results obtained for low and 
high values for E and P, also indicate that surfaces for intent to apply, turnover intent, and 
perceived N-S fit were rotated relative to the line of P-E fit. In all, no P-E fit effects were 
found for span of control and variety. Hence there was no support for H3 when it came to 
these job facets. 
 According to Edwards (2002, 2007), it is also meaningful to examine the shape of 
the response surface along the line of P-E fit (P = E). Specifically, the linear combination b3 
+ b4 + b5 represents the curvature of the surface along the line of P-E fit, while b1 + b2 
represents the slope at the point E = 0 and P = 0. If the surface was flat along the P-E fit 
line, then b1 + b2 and b3 + b4 + b5 should both equal zero. As reported in columns 8 and 9 of 
table 17, this condition was observed for the surfaces linking autonomy and variety to job 
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satisfaction and intent to apply. These results imply that job satisfaction and intent to apply 
do not vary with absolute amounts of subjective E and P for autonomy and variety. While 
this result is in line with the strict view of some classic fit research that outcomes are 
maximized as long as P-E fit exists, regardless of the magnitudes of E and P (French et al., 
1982; Locke, 1976; Rice et al., 1985), others have argued more recently that the surface 
along the line of P-E fit need not necessarily be flat in order to conclude the existence of P-
E fit effects (Edwards, 2007). For instance, more positive outcomes could result when both 
E and P are high than when both are low because wanting and attaining high levels of P and 
E respectively can also bring about a sense of self-actualization (Edwards & Rothbard, 
1999). This would suggest that work attitudes could be higher when both E and P are high 
than when both are low. In the current analyses, a positive slope (p < .01) was obtained for 
the surface linking autonomy to facet satisfaction. This result suggests that satisfaction with 
autonomy was higher at high levels autonomy compared to lower levels of autonomy. 
Another positive slope (p < .01) was found for the surface linking variety to turnover intent, 
which implies that turnover intent was higher at higher levels of variety compared to lower 
levels of variety. It is also observed that the surface linking variety and perceived N-S fit 
had a negative slope (p < .10), which suggests that perceived N-S fit was actually lower at 
high levels of variety compared to lower levels of variety. The previous three conclusions 
could be readily made based on the direction of the slope along the P-E fit line because the 
slopes were not accompanied by any curvatures.  
The presence of curvature along the line of P-E fit implies that the slopes along the 
P-E fit line varied according to the absolute levels of E and P. As reported in column 9 of 
table 17, there were several surfaces with significant curvatures. All of these curvatures 
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except for the one involving turnover intent as an outcome were positive, which suggests 
that the surfaces were curved upward. This observation implies that as E and P increased 
concurrently from relatively low levels, respective outcomes initially decreased and then 
increased as E and P reached relatively high levels. In contrast, downward curvatures were 
obtained for surfaces linking autonomy and span of control to turnover intent. Hence, 
turnover intent initially increased as E and P increased together from relatively low levels 
of E and P, and decreased as E and P reached relatively high levels.  
Supplemental analyses 
 Results so far provide generally weak support for the affective-consistency and 
hedonistic relationships that were proposed to link work-based affect and E and. In order to 
explore whether alternative relationships existed between affect and E and P, several 
additional exploratory analyses were conducted. 
 Alternative groups of relative E and P.  As discussed earlier, hypotheses 1 and 
2 are based on the assumption that work-based affect is maximized when E and P are 
exactly equal. However, results from tests on the effect of P-E fit on job satisfaction, a 
variable with significant affective content (Locke, 1969; Brief & Weiss, 2002), suggest that 
satisfaction is not at its highest level when P-E fit exists. Since this finding violates a key 
the assumption upon which earlier hypotheses about the influence of work-based affect on 
E and P are based on, additional analyses that account for the possibility that affect was 
being maximized at some point other than that of P-E fit were conducted. These 
supplemental analyses assumed that job satisfaction and its affective component could act 
as a proxy for relationships involving work-based affect and subjective E and P. It was first 
important to find out exactly where job satisfaction was being maximized along the surface 
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linking E and P to job satisfaction (see figures 9a to 9c). Determining the line where 
satisfaction was maximized involved calculating equations for the principal axis of the 
surface, which describes the overall orientation of the surface with respect to the E, P plane 
(Edwards, 2002). Specifically, the equation for the first principal axis (P = p10 + p11E) was 
calculated using formulae from Edwards (2002; also see Edwards & Parry, 1993). Results 
from these analyses are reported in table 18. Data from individuals was then grouped into 
cases that fell either below or above the principal axis by creating a dummy variable. This 
dummy variable Wpa grouped responses according to whether 
 E < P* or E > P*, where P* represents the equation of the principal axis P*= p10 + p11E. 
Hence, the following models describing the effect of work-based affect on E and P were 
estimated: 
E = b0 + b1A + b2AD + b3Wpa + b4AWpa + b5ADWpa + b6ED1 + b7ED2 + e (38) 
P = b0 + b1A + b2AD + b3Wpa + b4AWpa + b5ADWpa + e    (39) 
where A denoted work-based affect, D was a dummy variable that denoted whether affect 
was above or below neutral level, and ED1 and ED2 were control variables for manipulated 
groups of objective E. The above model was derived from the original models in equations 
6 and 7 by simply replacing the dummy variables W1 and W2, which were based on relative 
values of E and P (i.e. E > P, E = P, and E < P), with a single dummy variable Wpa which 
was based on the current principal axis groupings. As in earlier analyses, HLM methods 
were also employed to account for the possible non-independence in the data. 
  Similar to earlier analyses for hypotheses 1 and 2, the current analyses facilitated 
the separate analysis of the relationships between work-based affect and subjective E and P 
according to the response’s position relative to the principal axis, and whether affect was 
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more positive or negative compared to a neutral level. To facilitate the reporting and 
interpretation of results, findings are discussed according to simple slopes derived from 
equations 38 and 39. 
 Evaluating H1a and H2a and the relationship between affect and E, when E > P* 
(Wpa  = 1) and affect is negative (D = 0), involves analyzing the following simple slope 
equation: 
E = (b0 + b3) + (b1 + b4)A + b6ED1 + b7ED2 + e  (40) 
P = (b0 + b3) + (b1 + b4)A + e     (41) 
The linear combination b1 + b4 represents the relationships between affect and both E and P 
in the above equations. Results from analyses based on these models are reported in 
column 1 of table 20. Only the relationship between work-based affect and perceptions of 
span of control for E was significant (p < .10). This result supports the affective-
consistency perspective because people developed cognitions consistent with misfit and 
negative affect by perceiving that a job offered even more span of control when E already 
exceeded P*. 
 When affect is positive (D =1), the relationships between affect and E and P are 
represented by the following equations:  
E = (b0 + b3) + (b1 + b2 + b4 + b5)A + b6ED1 + b7ED2 + e  (42) 
P = (b0 + b3) + (b1 + b2 + b4 + b5)A + e    (43) 
Thus, the linear combination b1 + b2 + b4 + b5 describes the influence of affect on E and P. 
According to results reported in column 2 of table 20, there was only support for the 
affective-consistency perspective (H1a) for the relationship between affect and subjective P 
in autonomy (p < .05). Individuals increased the amount of autonomy that they wanted in 
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their jobs towards the direction of P-E fit in order to be consistent with experienced 
positive affect. There was also support for hedonistic relationships and H2a. Specifically, 
individuals experiencing positive affect were not inclined to change subjective E for 
autonomy and variety. Similarly, the individuals also did not change subjective P for span 
of control and variety when positive affect was experienced. The lack of relationships 
between affect and E and P above constitute support for the hedonistic idea that people will 
only be inclined to change perceptions of E and P when negative affect is experienced. 
 Hypotheses 1b and 2b describe the effects of work-based affect on E and P when 
perceptions of what a job environment can offer (E) is less than what individuals (P) desire 
(Wpa = 0). When affect is negative (D = 0), the simple slope equations become: 
E = b0 + b1A + b6ED1 + b7ED2 + e  (44) 
P = b0 + b1A + e    (45) 
Therefore, b1 denotes the effect of affect on E and P respectively in the above equations. 
From column 3 in table 20 one can see that there is only a significant relationship between 
affect and subjective P for span of control (p < .05). This negative relationship between 
affect and P is in line with the affective consistency perspective’s prediction that people 
will attempt to achieve P-E misfit that is consistent with negative affect by wanting more 
span of control in their jobs when E is less than P. Conversely, when affect is positive (D = 
1) the simple slope equations become: 
E = b0 + (b1 + b2)A + b6ED1 + b7ED2 + e  (46) 
P = b0 + (b1 + b2)A + e    (47) 
Now the linear combination b1 + b2 describes the relationship between affect and E and P. 
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As seen in column 4 of table 20, these relationships were mostly non-significant. This 
finding is in line with the hedonistic perspective’s prediction that people will not be 
motivated to change E and P when already enjoying positive affect.  
Overall, results from these supplementary analyses indicate that there is generally 
limited and mixed support for both affective-consistency and hedonistic relationships that 
were predicted. The little support that was observed for consistency relationships tended to 
be for span of control facet, and when negative affect was experienced. In contrast, 
hedonistic predictions were only supported when positive affect was experienced.   
 Curvilinear and linear affect relationships.   It is possible that the piecewise 
relationships between affect and E and P originally proposed above were too restrictive, 
and that relationships between these concepts could exist in other functional forms instead. 
To this end, the data were re-analyzed to see if relationships between work-based affect and 
E and P could be described by more general curvilinear and linear forms. To accommodate 
this new set of analyses, equations 1 and 2 were adjusted to represent curvilinear 
relationships between affect and E and P. The new models linking affect and E and P are 
presented below in equations 48 and 49:  
E =  b0 + b1A + b2A2 + b3W1 + b4AW1 + b5A2W1  
+ b6W2 + b7AW2 + b8A2W2 + b9ED1 + b10ED2 + e  (48) 
P =  b0 + b1A + b2A2 + b3W1 + b4AW1 + b5A2W1  
+ b6W2 + b7AW2 + b8A2W2 + e    (49) 
Consistent with earlier analyses, “A” represents work-based affect , whereas W1 and W2 
are categorical variables that represent three distinct groups of relative E and P (E > P, E = 
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P, and E < P). Analyses for these models were again run in HLM to account for possible 
non-independence of observations.  
 An omnibus test for curvilinear affect relationships was first conducted on the two 
models above. This involved conducting joint significance tests on the three curvilinear 
affect terms (b2, b5, and b8) in the above models. Results reported in table 22 indicate that 
there are significant curvilinear relationships relating affect to both E and P perceptions 
(both p < .01) for span of control. Specifically, for span of control, there was a significant 
curvilinear relationship linking affect to E (p < .10) when E exceeded P. In contrast, there 
was a curvilinear relationship between affect and P (p < .01) when E was less than P. 
Lastly, when P-E fit already existed (E = P) there were curvilinear relationships linking 
affect to both E and P (both p < .01). Therefore, it appears that when misfit between E and 
P exist (i.e. E > P and E < P), individuals responded to any shift in affect away from a 
neutral level by increasing the degree of misfit which already exists between E and P. 
However, those who were already experiencing P-E fit (P = E) increased both E and P by 
relatively similar amounts in response to both positive and negative affect, as if to maintain 
fit between E and P. All these significant curvilinear relationships are depicted in figures 
10a to 10c. As in the previous section of supplemental analyses, to account for the fact that 
affect may not be maximized along the line of P-E fit, these analyses were repeated where 
responses were grouped according to whether they fell above or below principal axes. 
Identical results were obtained where curvilinear relationships were observed linking affect 
to E and P (both p < .10) for span of control. Specifically, curvilinear relationships were 
observed between affect and E for responses that lay to the right of the principal axis (E > 
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P*), whereas curvilinear relationships were obtained linking affect and P for both E > P* 
and E < P* groups. 
 Since curvilinear relationships were not observed for the facets of autonomy and 
variety, additional analyses were conducted to probe if even simpler linear relationships 
existed between affect and E and P for these facets. These analyses involved estimating 
equations 50 and 51, which represent linear relationships between affect and E and P 
respectively11.  
E = b0 + b1A + b2W1 + b3AW1 + b4W2 + b5AW2 + b6ED1 + b7ED2 + e (50) 
P = b0 + b1A + b2W1 + b3AW1 + b4W2 + b5AW2 + e    (51) 
As in the case of analyzing curvilinear relationships, an omnibus test of the linear affect 
terms b1, b3, and b5 was first conducted. As shown in table 24, these omnibus tests indicate 
that there are significant linear relationships between affect and person (P) perceptions in 
autonomy (p < .10) and variety (p < .05). Tests on affect-based coefficients further suggest 
that positive linear relationships specifically existed between affect and P, when E = P on 
both autonomy (p < .05) and variety (p < .05) facets. Thus, participants who were already 
experiencing P=E fit wanted less autonomy and variety in their jobs as their experienced 
work-based affect shifted from neutral to negative. In contrast, when affect moved from 
neutral to positive, participants indicated that they wanted more autonomy and variety in 
their jobs. These results are represented graphically in figures 21 to 23. No significant 
linear relationships linking affect and E and P were detected when these analyses were 
repeated based on principal axis groupings. 
  In summary, results from these exploratory analyses indicate that curvilinear 
relationships exist between work-based affect and E and P for span of control. Individuals 
                                                 
11 These analyses were also run using HLM. 
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perceived that a job offered higher amounts of span of control (E) when affect shifted in 
both positive and negative directions. The same curvilinear relationship was observed for 
subjective P, where people increased the amount of span of control that they desired as 
affect shifted away from the neutral level. Thus, it appears that shifts in work-based affect 
away from a neutral level cause people to react in the same way: by perceiving increasing 
amounts of span of control and also wanting more of span of control in their jobs. Linear 
relationships between work-based affect and the subjective person (P) were also observed 
for autonomy and variety. This relationship was apparent for people who were 
experiencing P-E fit, who responded to negative shifts in affect by decreasing the amount 
of autonomy and variety they wanted in their jobs. Correspondingly, positive shifts in 
affect initiated an increase in the amount of desired autonomy and variety. Hence, it 
appears that people respond to negative job-related feelings by wanting less of autonomy 
and variety, whereas positive feelings engender increased desired amounts of these job 
facets.
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 9 
DISCUSSION 
 The present study sought to investigate whether work-based affect could be both a 
cause and an outcome of P-E fit. Consistent with previous research in P-E fit, results 
showed that subjective E and P are linked to a variety of affective work attitudes such as 
job and facet satisfaction, intent to apply, and turnover intent. Results indicated that job 
satisfaction grew more positive as E increased or P decreased for autonomy, when the 
perceived environment (E) was less than individual wants (P). Correspondingly, when E 
exceeded P, job satisfaction grew more negative as E increased or P decreased in the same 
job facet. However, the set of hypothesized relationships which examined work-based 
affect as a cause of P-E fit received limited support. The only consistent support that was 
observed for these hypotheses was for the hedonistic assertion that people would not be 
motivated to change E and/or P when they experience positive affect. Perhaps the current 
hypotheses based on consistency and hedonistic perspectives may have proved to be too 
rigid for the types of relationships actually observed in this study. Exploratory analyses add 
some support to this argument by showing that work-based affect indeed influenced certain 
groups of participants in certain ways. Specifically, curvilinear relationships were detected 
between affect and E and P for span of control. Interestingly, people who were already 
experiencing misfit between E and P responded to any shifts in affect away from a neutral 
level by adjusting E or P in such a way so as to increase the degree of misfit between E and 
P. In contrast, when P-E fit already existed, people sought to maintain P-E fit by changing 
 
 
  
E and P together in the same direction. Hence, it seems that any changes to E and P in 
response to affect depend on relative levels of E and P and whether P-E fit or misfit exists. 
  Work-based affect also influenced the amount of autonomy and variety that people 
wanted in their jobs. However, as opposed to the curvilinear relationships obtained for span 
of control, more straightforward linear effects were observed in this case. Negative shifts in 
affect were accompanied by decreases in desired autonomy and variety, whereas positive 
affect shifts induced increases in the amount desired for these two job facets. Aside from 
suggesting that personal wants for autonomy and variety may be malleable in response to 
changes in work-based affect, these results could also imply that people may be adjusting 
their wants downwards in response to negative affect so as to avoid being disappointed 
with the amount of autonomy and variety that a job offers. Correspondingly, perhaps 
people may also feel more comfortable increasing their desired amounts of autonomy and 
variety when they are experiencing positive affect because positive affect may induce a 
sense of optimism, and hence a willingness to desire more from one’s job environment. 
It should also be noted that this study exposed the consistency and hedonistic 
hypotheses to stringent tests that constituted high risks of falsification (Edwards, 2007). 
First, the experimental design that was employed successfully manipulated and measured 
specific variables that were of interest. Precise directional predictions were also made as to 
whether E and/or P should increase, decrease, or remain the same for similarly explicit 
ranges of work-based affect. By examining the relationships between work-based affect 
and both subjective E and P respectively, hypotheses were also made based on relationships 
that accurately represented the complex entity of P-E fit (Edwards, 1994; Edwards et al., 
2006). Furthermore, established measures were employed, where most exhibited good 
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reliability12. Last but not least, estimates also suggest that statistical power exceeded the 
commonly accepted benchmark of .80. Overall, considering the rigorous methodological 
standards that were employed in this study, the current results can be interpreted as 
falsifying evidence against ideas from consistency and hedonistic perspectives.    
Limitations 
 There are several limitations to the above study that could have undermined efforts 
to examine hypothesized relationships, especially those linking work-based affect to 
subjective E and P. First, it is debatable whether the contrived experimental setting 
provided a situation realistic enough for the intricate psychological mechanisms of either 
consistency or hedonistic processes to operate. Participants could therefore not have had 
enough freedom and/or time to adjust perceptions of E and P in response to the affect 
manipulation. It may also be the case that the current job search context was not realistic 
enough for the operation of consistency or hedonistic processes. People may react more 
proactively to changes in work-based affect when they are already in a particular job as 
compared to if they were merely job seekers because they may have a larger vested interest 
in regulating or improving their current situation or feelings about a job. Thus, different 
relationships involving E and P might have been observed had affect been produced by 
real-life events or occurrences that had actual consequences for participants.  
 On a similar note, this study could have also suffered from the effects of a restricted 
range in manipulated work-based affect. Though manipulation checks confirmed that the 
participants in the three affect manipulation groups differed significantly from each other 
on the manipulated variable, it could still be argued that differences in affect across 
conditions were rather limited. For instance, according to table 10, the difference between 
                                                 
12 See table 9 for reliability statistics. 
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mean levels of affect for positive and neutral manipulation groups was only .57, while the 
difference between negative and neutral groups was only slightly larger at .74. Considering 
that work-based affect was measured on a 9-point scale ranging from -4 to +4, these mean 
differences were substantively small. That being said, it is debatable whether observed 
results would have been significantly different had there been a larger variance in work-
based affect.  That is, unless it produces a phenomenologically different affective 
experience among participants, a larger variance on affect would presumably accentuate the 
relationships between affect and E and P that were observed in this study. Hence, it remains 
to be seen if a wider range of affect would produce relationships in line with those 
predicted by consistency or hedonistic perspectives. 
 The current study also did not take into account the influence of the objective 
person (P) when analyzing the relationship between work-based affect and subjective P. 
Original designs of this study had attempted to manipulate objective P via feedback from a 
bogus survey on job preferences. However, pre-testing results proved this method to be 
ineffective, and the plan to manipulate objective P was dropped. The omission of objective 
P is a shortcoming because subjective P should logically be influenced considerably by 
objective P. Hence, the inability to control for the effects of objective P on subjective P 
could have affected this study’s ability to detect the effects of affect on subjective P that 
were above and beyond those of objective P.  
 Lastly, by focusing on needs-supplies (N-S) fit, this study only examined one of 
several types of P-E fit. Though recent theorizing on the relationships between P-E fit and 
outcomes has argued that N-S fit should be the most directly linked to affective constructs 
among various types of fit (Edwards & Shipp, 2007), previous research has also linked 
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other types of fit (e.g. values congruence and demands-abilities fit) to affective outcomes 
like job satisfaction. It thus remains to be seen if consistency or hedonistic relationships 
would be supported for these different types of P-E fit. 
Future research 
 This section builds upon the above-mentioned limitations in the present study to 
suggest areas for further research that may help us investigate affective influences on P-E 
fit. As already alluded to above, consistency and hedonistic relationships between work-
based affect and E and P might be more observable in actual real-life situations. It has been 
well-established that events or important happening s are key antecedents to work-based 
affect (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996)  Therefore, future research would do well to investigate 
the impact of changes in work-based affect that has been precipitated by organizationally-
relevant events on P-E fit. One such category of phenomena is organizational change. 
Previous research has reported that organizational change in the form of critical events such 
as downsizing (Wiesenfeld, Brockner & Martin, 1999), acquisitions (Vince, 2006; Scheck 
& Kinicki, 2000), and relocations (Fox & Krausz, 1987) can significantly influence work-
based affect of employees involved. In turn, organizational change has also previously been 
linked to perceived changes in P-E fit (Caldwell, Herold & Fedor, 2004). It would therefore 
be interesting to see if the changes in work-based affect that accompany organizational 
change trigger responses to adjust E and P that are in line with the affective-consistency or 
hedonistic perspectives proposed in this paper. 
 Another category of affect-inducing phenomena that may be of interest to the 
current research paradigm is leadership. Leaders can influence the moods and emotions that 
their subordinates experience toward work through their behavior and displayed affect. For 
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instance, transformational leaders often utilize powerful emotions to arouse similar feelings 
among employees (Brief & Weiss, 2002). Similarly, the emotions that leaders display can 
also have a direct effect on the affective states of their surrounding audience (Lewis, 2000). 
This ability of leaders to influence work-based affect of their employees could have 
interesting implications for P-E fit and person-supervisor (P-S) fit in particular (Barrett, 
1995; Tsui, Porter & Egan, 2002, Turban & Jones, 1988). Specifically, future research 
could investigate how subordinate emotions that are generated by their leaders impact P-S 
fit by studying the relationships between affect and the fit between perceptions of personal 
(P) and leader attributes (S).  
         Organizational rewards and punishments constitute another potential affect-laden 
situation where current relationships of interest can be studied. Though it should be 
intuitive that rewards (e.g. obtaining promotions and raises) and punishments (e.g. being 
written up for a rule infraction) perpetuate affective reactions among workers, empirical 
research linking such events to work-based affect has been surprisingly limited (Brief & 
Weiss, 2002). Future, research can thus not only fill this gap in knowledge, but also provide 
answers to questions about whether changes in work-based affect arising from such events 
impact the E and P components of person-job and/or person-organization fit. 
 Overall, though it could mean forgoing a significant amount of ability to infer 
causal relationships, future research may consider studying people and their reactions to 
work-based affect in more naturalistic work environments and specifically under the 
circumstances mentioned above. Such research can both help address issues regarding the 
restricted range of work-based affect, and also drastically increase the fidelity of affective 
experience by situating it in actual circumstances with real consequences.  
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 The fact that this study investigated relationships between work-based affect and E 
and P that have seldom been assessed in previous P-E fit research also means that it is 
unclear as to whether the currently employed methods of analyses were adequate to assess 
complex relationships involving E and P as joint outcomes of work-based affect. Therefore 
future research might consider employing other research methods in field settings that 
complement survey methodology. For instance, compared to survey measures, 
investigational methods such as verbal protocol analyses might allow researchers to better 
probe and track the sophisticated thought sequences that might take place during 
consistency and/or hedonistic processes. Furthermore, experience sampling procedures 
(Brief & Weiss, 2002; Weiss et al., 1999) could also facilitate the closer monitoring of 
changes in work-based affect and the corresponding effect that these changes have on 
subjective E and P perceptions. 
 Future research can also explore alternative ways to measure the objective 
environment (E) construct.  Instead of using perceptions from the individuals involved in 
the actual P-E fit judgments, ratings of the objective environment may be obtained from 
databases such as the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), or occupational databases 
like O*NET. Another option would be to make use of ratings from professional job 
analysts or experienced job incumbents like supervisors. The utility of this latter method 
was demonstrated when Caldwell and O’Reilly (1990) surveyed job experts and 
experienced job incumbents to obtain measures of objective job environments in their 
investigation of person-job (P-J) fit. Similarly, future research may also assess objective P 
using alternative information sources. Ratings of person attributes such as personality 
(Antonioni & Park, 2001) and emotional intelligence (Law, Wong & Song, 2004) has 
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frequently used ratings from peers and significant others. This strategy can also be 
employed in the current research program where ratings of objective P may be obtained 
from co-workers or significant others such as spouses or other family members. Having 
different rating sources also minimizes potential concerns about common-method bias, and 
aid in the investigation of affective-influences on subjective E and P over and above 
objective E and P. 
 Aside from facilitating the measurement of these constructs, a further advantage to 
obtaining third-party ratings of objective E and P is that it also allows one to probe if 
changes in work-based affect can also bring about changes in objective E and P. This study 
focused on subjective P-E fit by investigating how work-based affect influenced subjective 
perceptions of E and P. However, according to the current expanded model of P-E fit, 
work-based affect can also bring about changes in objective P-E fit. This ability of affect to 
cause changes in objective E and P is documented in both affective-consistency and 
hedonistic perspectives. For instance, consistency arguments point to the ability of positive 
affect to initiate affectively-consistent helping behaviors aimed at improving one’s actual 
social environment (Isen et al., 1976; George & Brief, 1992). Likewise, cybernetic 
principles that underlie the hedonistic perspective also argue that individuals can respond to 
the negative affect brought about by a stressful discrepancy by altering their physical and 
social environments. Specifically, individuals might self-select out of their stressful 
environments by leaving their jobs. Furthermore, people can also respond to stress and 
negative affect by changing objective person attributes via the adjusting of personal goals 
or standards (Campion & Lord, 1982; Taylor, Fisher, Ilgen, 1984). Moreover, if we assume 
that objective E and P play very significant roles in determining their subjective 
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counterparts, it may be possible that any changes in subjective E and P must occur via 
objective E and P respectively. In other words, the influence of work-based affect on 
subjective E and P is mediated by objective E and P. This possibility was not evaluated in 
the present study because objective E was a manipulated variable, and objective P was left 
out altogether. Therefore, to gain a more complete understanding of relationships between 
work-based affect and P-E fit, future research should also examine how objective E and P 
are directly influenced by work-based affect 
 Further research should also explore the relationship between work-based affect and 
other types of P-E fit. Aside from the current needs-supplies paradigm, other prominent 
types of fit such as demands-abilities fit and values congruence have also been linked to 
affective attitudes and work-based affect (Cable & Edwards, 2004; Kristof-Brown et al., 
2005). For example, it could be assumed that in the case of value congruence fit, judgments 
of work values and organizational culture are more abstract and subject to perceptual biases 
compared to judgments of environment supplies. Thus, when P-E fit is analyzed as the fit 
between more ambiguous concepts like personal values and organizational culture (i.e. 
supplementary person-organization fit), perhaps people may be more apt to adjust their 
perceptions of the environment and organizational culture in response to changes in affect. 
Therefore, future research should explore whether relationships between affect and P-E fit 
exist when other types of P-E fit are examined. 
 Aside from examining relationships between work-based affect and P-E fit with 
other common types of P-E fit like values congruence and demands-abilities fit, other 
conceptualizations of P-E fit may also be explored. Correspondence or fit between 
individual performance (P) and goals (E) might be another type of P-E fit that might lend 
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itself nicely to research on affective-influence. Though past research in self-regulation and 
goal setting has examined how individuals manage the discrepancy between individual 
performance and goals, this research has largely focused on the impact of past performance 
and other individual differences (i.e. goal orientation and need for achievement) on the 
setting of future goals (Phillips, Hollenbeck & Ilgen, 1996; Phillips & Gully, 1997). Aside 
from ignoring the role of affect in causing performance and goals, such research focuses on 
goals that are set by the individual, not perceptions of goals that have already been set, 
which this paper argues can also be influenced by affect. Hence, for a hypothetical study 
based on the current expanded P-E fit model, the affective-consistency perspective would 
predict that positive shifts in affect would be accompanied by attempts to achieve fit 
between individual performance (P) and goals (E) that is consistent with positive affect. 
Correspondingly, negative shifts in affect would lead to changes in P and E so as to create a 
discrepancy between performance and goals because misfit is consistent with negative 
affect. On the other hand, the hedonistic perspective would predict that shifts toward 
positive affect would not influence P-E fit, while shifts toward negative affect would cause 
attempts to change performance and goals so as to achieve fit between the two. Adopting 
this person-goal conceptualization of fit would be quite viable for research in a field setting 
because information on goals and performance can be obtained or measured relatively 
easily. Objective goals can be readily obtained from organizational records in the form of 
performance standards or goals set by superiors, while performance data such as customer 
feedback and or supervisor performance ratings can be treated as measures of objective 
performance.  Ratings of subjective E and P can then be measured from individual 
perceptions of their own performance and the objective goals that have already been set. 
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 Future research and theory building may also consider other possible antecedents to 
P-E fit aside from work-based affect. Up to this point, the limited efforts to examine 
antecedents to fit have largely focused on broad organization-level policies such as 
recruitment, selection, and socialization of newcomers (Chatman, 1991; Cable & Parsons, 
2001; Kim, Cable & Kim,2005; Kristof, 1996). Perhaps future research may investigate 
other psychological variables and process that might be involved in causing judgments of 
P-E fit. For example, perceptions of subjective E and P on certain job facets could be 
driven by existing P-E fit (or misfit) on other job facets. In other words, when making 
judgments of subjective E and P on variety, individuals could be considering whether fit or 
misfit already exists on autonomy. If fit (misfit) already exists on autonomy, people may be 
prompted to be consistent and judge that fit (misfit) also exists between E and P on variety. 
In contrast, existing misfit on autonomy may also trigger regulatory process that are in line 
with the hedonistic perspective, and cause people to perceive P-E fit on variety in order to 
compensate for the misfit on autonomy. 
 Current results from this study may also point towards the existence of other types 
of relationships that might govern causal relationships leading from work-based affect to P-
E fit. One such relationship might involve the tendency to have a set point of P-E fit, where 
any change in work-based affect and/or P-E fit initiates reactionary thoughts and behavior 
that are targeted at returning the individual back to his or her original P-E fit status. This 
idea is drawn from Landy’s opponent process theory of job satisfaction (1978), which 
suggests that a state of hedonic neutrality exists for people, where any excursion from this 
state is accompanied by an attempt to bring work-based affect back to its original level. A 
similar phenomenon could occur in the context of P-E fit where each individual has his or 
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her own predetermined P-E fit status which he or she tries to maintain. Hence, any change 
in affect that impacts the current level of P-E fit would be met with attempts to bring P-E fit 
back to its original levels. The current study presents some initial evidence of such 
relationships, where any change to work-based affect away from a neutral level caused both 
E and P (for span of control) to increase concurrently for people who were already 
experiencing P-E fit. This means that people were reacting to changes to work-based affect 
by adjusting E and Pin the same direction perhaps in order to return to their original status 
of P-E fit. 
 Lastly, the effect of work-based affect on expectations regarding job supplies and 
how those expectations impact job desires could also be explored. Current results indicate 
that people desired more autonomy and variety in their jobs as work-based affect increased 
from negative to positive (figures 11a and 11b). Since positive affect are associated with 
feelings of optimism (Marshall, Wortman, Kusulas, Hervig & Vickers, 1992; Segerstrom, 
Taylor, Kemeny & Fahey, 1998), these results could imply that as people feel more 
positive about their jobs their optimism causes them to expect more supplies from their job, 
which in turn leads them to increase desired amounts of certain job facets. Aside from 
findings that positive mood is associated with positive expectancies for individuals’ futures 
(Segerstrom et al., 1998), emotions and affect have also been closely linked to individual 
wants and desires (Kavanagh , Andrade & May, 2005; Mehrabian & DeWetter, 1987). 
Furthermore, work-based affect in the form of job satisfaction has also been observed to 
impact the setting of personal desired goals (Locke, Cartledge & Knerr, 1970). These 
findings may suggest that work-based affect could have a direct and positive effect on 
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individual needs and the person component of P-E fit, where an increase in positive affect 
causes an increase in job-based desires.  
Conclusion 
 While this investigation yielded limited support for the hypothesized relationships 
between work-based affect and the environment and person components of P-E fit. The 
existence of some curvilinear and linear relationships between affect and subjective E and 
P may suggest the existence of other forms of relationships between affect and E and P that 
are different from those initially proposed. This may serve as initial support for the general 
idea that work-based affect can also be a cause of P-E fit. Based on the preponderance and 
strength of previous theory regarding affective influences behind P-E fit, these results may 
still present hope for future research on the affect to fit relationship. It is my hope that this 
study has helped identify several fruitful avenues in terms of theorizing, research design, 
and methodology that may be used to further examine relationships involving work-based 
affect and P-E fit in the future.   
  
Table 1. Hypotheses for relationships based on the affective-consistency perspective. 
 
Hypothesis Levels of E and P Affect Shift from 
Neutral to Positive 
Mood 
Affect Shift from 
Neutral to Negative 
Mood 
1(a) When E is greater 
than P 
E decreases and P 
increases 
E increases and P 
decreases 
1(b) When E is less than 
P 
E increases and P 
decreases 
E decreases and P 
increases 
1(c) When E is equal to P No change in E and P No change in E and P 
 
 
Table 2. Hypotheses for relationships based on the hedonistic perspective. 
 
Hypothesis Levels of E and P Affect Shift from 
Neutral to Positive 
Mood 
Affect Shift from 
Neutral to Negative 
Mood 
2(a) When E is greater 
than P 
No change in E and P E decreases and P 
increases 
2(b) When E is less than 
P 
No change in E and P E increases and P 
decreases 
2(c) When E is equal to P No change in E and P No change in E and P 
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Table 3. Examples of parabolic relationships across job facets. 
 
Dimension Why excess E leads to decreased work 
attitudes 
Variety Excess variety on the job can interfere with 
one’s needs to develop expertise in specific 
skills. 
Span of Control (Management) Excess opportunities to manage others can 
interfere with one’s need to have 
communal relationships with coworkers.   
Autonomy Excess autonomy on the job can interfere 
with one’s need for supervision and 
guidance. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Hypotheses for effect of P-E fit on work attitudes. 
 
Hypothesis Levels of E and P E increases and P 
decreases 
E decreases and P 
increases 
3(a) When E is less than 
P 
Work attitudes 
increases 
Work attitudes 
decreases 
3(b) When E is greater 
than P 
Work attitudes 
decreases 
Work attitudes 
increases 
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Table 5. Pre-testing: Means for work-based affect. 
 
Work-based Affect Mean 
Positive 1.43 
Neutral .80 
Negative -.82 
 
  
Table 6. Pre-testing: Pairwise Comparisons based on HLM analyses. 
 
Omnibus (F-value) Pairwise Group Comparisons Mean Difference 
60.18** Positive vs Neutral .63** 
Positive vs  Negative 2.25** 
  Neutral vs Negative 1.62** 
 * p < .05; ** p < .01  
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Table 7. Pre-testing: Descriptive statistics for environment perceptions. 
 
Job Facet (Environment) level Mean 
Variety High 4.40 
Moderate 3.78 
Low 2.86 
Span of Control High 5.52 
Moderate 3.95 
Low 2.41 
Autonomy High 5.58 
Moderate 4.22 
  Low 2.98 
 
Table 8. Pre-testing: Pairwise Comparisons based on HLM analyses. 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Omnibus (F-
value) 
Pairwise Group 
Comparisons 
Mean 
Difference 
Variety 9.98** High vs Moderate .62† 
High vs Low 1.53** 
Moderate vs Low .91 
Span of Control 44.76*** High vs Moderate 1.57** 
High vs Low 3.11** 
Moderate vs Low 1.54** 
Autonomy 37.54*** High vs Moderate 1.36** 
High vs Low 2.60** 
    Moderate vs Low 1.25** 
† p <.10; * p < .05; ** p < .01  
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Table 9. Manipulation checks: Descriptive statistics for work-based affect. 
 
 
Work-based Affect Mean 
Positive 1.26 
Neutral .69 
Negative -.05 
 
 
Table 10. Manipulation checks: Pairwise Comparisons based on HLM analyses. 
 
Omnibus (F-
value) 
Pairwise Group 
Comparisons 
Mean 
Difference 
43.48** Positive vs Neutral .57** 
Positive vs  Negative 1.31** 
  Neutral vs Negative .74** 
 * p < .05; ** p < .01  
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Table 11. Means for environment perceptions. 
 
Job Facet (Environment) level Mean 
Variety High 5.62 
Moderate 3.28 
Low 2.87 
Span of Control High 5.09 
Moderate 4.14 
Low 2.44 
Autonomy High 5.29 
Moderate 4.32 
  Low 3.23 
 
Table 12. Pairwise comparisons based on HLM analyses. 
 
Dependent Variable Omnibus (F-value) Pairwise Group Comparisons Mean Difference 
Variety 304.47** High vs Moderate 2.34** 
High vs Low 2.75** 
Moderate vs Low .41** 
Span of Control 255.03** High vs Moderate .94** 
High vs Low 2.65** 
Moderate vs Low 1.71** 
Autonomy 116.09** High vs Moderate .97** 
High vs Low 2.06** 
    Moderate vs Low 1.09** 
 * p < .05; ** p < .01 
  
Table  13.  Correlations and descriptive statistics. 
 
    M sd 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 
1. Affect 0.64 0.94 (.93) 
Person Variables 
2. Autonomy 5.38 0.81 .03 (.73) 
3. Span of Control 4.75 1.14 .07 .12 (.90) 
4. Variety 5.05 0.93 .02 .38 .18 (.78) 
Environment Variables 
5. Autonomy 4.28 1.44 .06 .14 -.08 .06 (.86) 
6. Span of Control 3.89 1.50 .02 -.04 .23 .08 -.18 (.94) 
7. Variety 3.92 1.60 -.01 -.01 .08 .07 -.30 .12 (.92) 
Job Outcomes 
8. Intent to Apply 4.19 1.16 .09 -.01 .02 -.11 .31 .01 .04 (.84) 
9. Job Satisfaction 4.15 1.27 .15 -.02 -.04 -.08 .36 .05 .06 .85 (.92) 
10. Perceived N-S fit 3.87 1.24 .09 -.04 -.07 -.11 .35 .04 .00 .86 .90 (.91) 
11. Turnover intent 4.33 1.11 -.13 .06 .07 .12 -.36 -.01 .10 -.60 -.69 -.71 (.79) 
Facet Satisfaction 
12. Autonomy 4.75 1.53 .04 .14 -.07 .01 .63 -.18 -.10 .35 .40 .38 -.36 (.94) 
13. Span of Control 4.50 1.24 .10 .00 .26 .00 -.06 .43 .20 .25 .28 .23 -.19 .17 (.91) 
14. Variety 4.35 1.56 -.02 .00 .03 -.02 -.22 .00 .72 .18 .21 .16 -.07 .06 .28 (.93) 
Individual Differences 
15. Positive Affectivity 3.60 0.59 .32 .12 .12 .03 .07 -.01 .03 .15 .13 .10 -.02 .05 .13 .06 (.87) 
16. Negative Affectivity 1.99 0.55 -.18 -.05 -.19 -.10 -.09 -.06 -.04 -.05 -.12 -.06 .06 -.04 -.10 -.11 -.20 (.83) 
17. Preference for Consistency 4.50 0.85 .01 -.03 .01 -.06 .06 .00 .00 .02 .01 .02 .00 .05 .03 .03 .16 -.13 (.86) 
18. Self-Esteem 5.61 0.67 .19 .08 .09 .04 .07 .01 .03 .12 .15 .11 -.10 .06 .07 .07 .61 -.47 .13 (.73) 
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Note. Correlations greater than or equal to .09 in absolute magnitude are significant at p<.05; correlations greater than or equal to .12 
are significant at p<.01. Reliability estimates (Cronbach's alpha) are reported along the diagonal. 
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Table 14. Results from multilevel analyses of relationship between work-based affect and subjective E and subjective P 
 
    Intercept Aff Aff*D W1 Aff*W1 Aff*D*W1 W2 Aff*W2 Aff*D*W2 ED1 ED2 
b0 b b b b b b b b1 2 3 4 b5 6 7 b8 9 10 
Environment                       
Autonomy 3.84** .11 -.13 1.10** -.16 .46 1.63** -.01 .19 -.70** .54** 
Span of Control 4.34** .20 -.21 .54** -.73** 1.15** 1.09** -.20 .45 -.56** -1.98** 
Variety 2.79** .09 -.19 1.22** -.19 .21 1.34** .07 .14 1.74** .39** 
Person 
Autonomy 5.45** .03 -.09 -.28** -.10 .47* -.31* .05 .14 
Span of Control 4.72** -.29* .36* -.06 .13 .03 -.23 .36 -.34 
  Variety 5.18** -.09 .05 -.28† .41
† -.12 -.43** .45** -.37†     
 
Table 15. Results from significance tests of linear combinations of coefficients for H1 and H2. 
 117     1 2 3 4 5 6 
  Relationship with Affect E>P (A ≤ A*) E>P (A ≥ A*) E<P (A ≤ A*) E<P (A ≥ A*) E=P (A ≤ A*) E=P (A ≥ A*) 
  Hypotheses H1a & H2a H1a & H2a H1b & H2b H1b & H2b H1c & H2c H1c & H2c 
Coefficients Involved b1+b7 b1+b7+b2+b8 b1 b1+b2 b1+b4 b1+b4+b2+b5 
Environment             
Autonomy .10 .16 .11 -.02 -.05 .28
† 
Span of Control -.01 .23
† .20 -.01 -.53* .42* 
Variety .16 .11 .09 -.10 -.10 -.08 
Person 
Autonomy .09 .13 .03 -.06 -.06 .31** 
Span of Control .07 .09 -.29 .07 -.16 .23 
  Variety .36* .04 -.09 -.04 .32 .25 
 ** p < .01; * p < .05; † < .10 
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Table 16. Polynomial regression analyses relationships between P-E fit and work attitude outcomes. 
 
      
Constant E P E2 E*P P2 
DV Job Facet N b0 b b b b b1 2 3 4 5 
Job Satisfaction       
Autonomy 450 4.24** .09 -.06 -.03 .15** -.01 
Span of Control 450 4.15** -.10* .14 .02 .20** -.12** 
Variety 450 4.35** -.27** .20† -.09** .25** -.11* 
Facet Satisfaction 
Autonomy 450 4.46** .49** .23 -.08** .12** -.03 
Span of Control 450 4.40** .11** .28** -.06** .29** -.03 
Variety 450 4.51** .44** .00 -.04** .22** -.01 
Intent to Apply 
Autonomy 450 4.16** .06 .08 -.01 .12** -.05 
Span of Control 450 4.10** -.10** .13† .03 .14** -.07* 
Variety 450 4.38** -.26** .09 -.07** .23** -.08† 
Turnover Intent 
Autonomy 450 4.20** -.13† .21 -.02 -.10* -.01 
Span of Control 450 4.35** .05 -.04 -.05* -.12** .08** 
Variety 450 4.11** .30** -.03 .09** -.18** .04 
Perceived N-S Fit 
Autonomy 450 4.06** .09 -.22 -.04 .14** .03 
Span of Control 450 3.90** -.07 .07 .02 .17** -.10** 
Variety 450 4.14** -.30** .11 -.12** .25** -.07 
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      Lines of P-E Misfit   Line of P-E Fit 
Low Moderate High       
P = -2-E P = -E P = 2-E Same with 
Low and 
High Values? 
P=E 
DV Job Facet N b1-b2 b3-b4+b5 b1-b2 b3-b4+b5 b1-b2 b3-b4+b5 b b3+b4+b5 1+b2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Job Satisfaction     
Autonomy 450 -.12 -.20* .15 -.20* .18 -.20* Yes .03 .10 
Span of Control 450 .07 -.29* -.24* -.30** -.53** -.31** No .05 .10* 
Variety 450 -.41** -.45** -.47** -.45** -.47** -.44** Yes -.07 .05 
Facet Satisfaction 
Autonomy 450 -.07 -.21* .25 -.23** .34 -.23** Yes .72** .02 
Span of Control 450 -.21** -.40** -.17* -.38** -.08 -.34** No .39** .20** 
Variety 450 .38** -.31** .44** -.27** .63** -.23** Yes .44** .17** 
Intent to Apply 
Autonomy 450 -.09 -.18* -.03 -.19* -.11 -.20** Yes .14 .05 
Span of Control 450 -.03 -.19** -.23* -.19** -.42** -.20** No .03 .10** 
Variety 450 -.33** -.38** -.35** -.38** -.34 -.37** No -.17 .08 
Turnover Intent 
Autonomy 450 -.31† .06 -.34† .06 -.33 .06 No .08 -.13* 
Span of Control 450 -.18
† .14** .09 .15** .36** .15** No .01 -.08* 
Variety 450 .38** .30** .33** .31** .17 .27** No .27** -.06 
Perceived N-S Fit 
Autonomy 450 -.04
† -.14† .31 -.14† .44 -.14† Yes -.13 .13† 
Span of Control 450 .13 -.23** -.14 -.25** -.39** -.25** No .00 .09* 
Variety 450 -.48** -.43** -.41** -.43** -.28 -.41** No -.19† .06 
Table 17. Tests of linear combinations of coefficients for relationship between P-E fit and work attitude outcomes. 
 
** p < .01; * p < .05; † < .10 
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Table 18. Principal axis calculations for supplementary analyses. 
 
       Stationary Points Principle Axis 
Job Facet DV n E0 P0 p10 p11 
Autonomy JS 450 .32 -.43 -.79 1.14 
Span of Control JS 450 -.11 .49 .55 .51 
Variety JS 450 .31 1.26 .98 .92 
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Table 19. Regression models based on principal axes grouping of responses. 
 
    Intercept Aff Aff*D Wpa Aff*Wpa Aff*D*Wpa ED1 ED2 
b0 b b b b b b b1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Environment 
Autonomy 3.99** .08 -.02 .90** .04 .11 -.86** .87** 
 
Span of 
Control 3.55** .14 -.14 1.55** -.32
† .44† -.82** -1.53** 
Variety 3.01** .09 -.29† .68** .03 .31 2.26** .39** 
Person  
Autonomy 5.49** -.01 .00 -.55** .05 .16 
 
Span of 
Control 4.47** -.44** .52* .26* .32
† -.29   
  Variety 5.13** -.01 .02 -.45** .26 -.20     
** p < .01; * p < .05; † < .10 121
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    1 2 3 4 
E>P (A ≤ A*) E>P (A ≥ A*) E<P (A ≤ A*) E<P (A ≥ A*) 
H1a & H2a H1a & H2a H1b & H2b H1b & H2b 
Coefficients  b1+b4 b1+b4+b2+b5 b b1 1+b2 
Environment 
Autonomy .12 .21 .08 .06 
Span of Control -.18† .12† .14 .00 
Variety .12 .14 .09 -.20 
Person  
Autonomy .04 .20* -.01 -.01 
Span of Control -.13 .11 -.45** .08 
  Variety .24 .06 -.01 .01 
Table 20. Tests of hypotheses 1 and 2 based on principal axes grouping of responses. 
 
** p < .01; * p < .05; † < .10
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Table 21. Regression results from supplemental analyses of curvilinear regression model of E and P onto affect. 
 
    Intercept Aff Aff2 W1 Aff*W1 Aff2*W1 W2 Aff*W2 Aff2*W2 ED1 ED2 
    b0 b b b b b b b b b b1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Environment 
Autonomy 3.87** .06 -.06 1.04** .01 .23† 1.64** .08 .05 -.71** .54** 
Span of Control 4.33** .10 -.07 .53** -.16 .40 1.02 -.08 .26* -.54** -1.97** 
Variety 2.74** -.03 -.01 1.28** -.06 .01 1.34** .12 .06 1.75** .39** 
Person 
Autonomy 5.42** -.03 .00 -.28* .12 .16† -.30* .13 .03 
Span of Control 4.66** -.16† .20** -.11 .16 .03 -.24† .18 -.11 
  Variety 5.19** -.06 .01 -.27† .35* -.05 -.44** .26* -.10     
** p < .01; * p < .05; † < .10 123  
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Table 22. Tests for curvilinear relationships linking affect and E and P. 
 
      E vs P Group 
    Curvilinear Affect Comparisons E > P E = P E < P 
    Diff in curvilinear A across groups 
A2 
coefficient 
A2 
coefficient 
A2 
coefficient 
    b2, b5, b8 (F-value) b2 + b8 b2 + b5 b2 
Environment 
Autonomy 1.20 -.01 .17 -.06 
Span of Control 5.39** .19† .33** -.07 
Variety 1.07 .05 -.01 -.01 
Person 
Autonomy 1.30 .03 .16† .00 
Span of Control 4.12** .08 .23** .20** 
  Variety .48 -.09 -.04 .01 
124
 ** p < .01; * p < .05; † < .10 
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W    Intercept A W1 AW1 2 AW2 ED1 ED2 
    b0 b b b b b b b1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Environment 
Autonomy 3.80** .02 1.24** .14 1.69** .12 -.69** .56** 
Span of Control 4.28** .06 .94** -.02 1.20** .11 -.58** -1.99** 
Variety 2.72** -.04 1.28** -.05 1.39** .16 1.75** .39** 
Person 
Autonomy 5.42** -.03 -.14 .20* -.27* .14 
Span of Control 4.83** -.06 -.03 .13 -.30 .12 
  Variety 5.20** -.06 -.31* .33* -.51* .20*     
Table 23. Regression analyses from supplemental analyses of linear regression model of E and P onto affect. 
      E versus P Groups 
Omnibus E > P E = P E < P 
Linear 
Terms A coefficient A coefficient A coefficient 
    
b1,b3,b5 
(F-value) 
b1 + b5 b1 + b3 b1 
Environment 
Autonomy 1.07 .14 .17 .02 
Span of Control 1.15 .16 .03 .06 
Variety .75 .12 -.09 -.04 
Person 
Autonomy 2.42† .12 .18* -.03 
Span of Control .73 .06 .08 -.06 
  Variety 3.47* .14 .27* -.06 
 
 
 
Table 24. Tests for linear relationships linking affect and E and P. 
** p < .01; * p < .05; † < .10 
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Figure 1. Person-environment fit theory. 
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Figure 2. An expanded model of Person-Environment fit. 
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Figure 3. Relationship between P-E fit and work-based affect. 
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Figure 4. Control theory and a negative feedback loop. 
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Figure 5. Model to be tested. 
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Figure 6. Hypothesized relationships between affect and E and P based on the affective 
consistency perspective when E is more than P. 
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Figure 7. Hypothesized relationships between affect and E and P based on the affective 
consistency perspective when E is less than P. 
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Figure 8. Hypothesized relationships between affect and E and P based on the affective 
consistency perspective when E is equal to P. 
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Figure 9. Hypothesized relationships between affect and E and P based on the hedonistic 
perspective when E is more than P. 
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Figure 10. Hypothesized relationships between affect and E and P based on the hedonistic 
perspective when E is less than P. 
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Figure 11. Hypothesized relationships between affect and E and P based on the hedonistic 
perspective when E is equal to P. 
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Figure 12. Hypothesized relationship of effect of P-E fit on work attitudes.  
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 13. Response surface plots with job satisfaction as a dependent variable. 
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Figure 14. Response surface plots with facet satisfaction as a dependent variable. 
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Figure 15. Response surface plots with intent to apply as a dependent variable. 
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Figure 16. Response surface plots with turnover intent as a dependent variable. 
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Figure 17. Response surface plots with perceived needs-supplies fit as a dependent variable. 
 
 
   
   Autonomy     Span of Control    Variety 
 
 
142
  
Figure 18. Plots of curvilinear relationships between work-based affect and E and P  for 
span of control (E = P). 
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Figure 19. Plot of curvilinear relationship between work-based affect and E for span of 
control (E > P). 
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Figure 20. Plot of curvilinear relationship between work-based affect and P  for span of 
control (E < P). 
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Figure 21. Plot of linear relationship between work-based affect and P  for autonomy. 
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Figure 22. Plot of linear relationship between work-based affect and P  for variety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix A: 
 
Job comments with manipulated information describing environments of three hypothetical 
jobs 
 
Version 1: High Variety, Moderate Span of Control, Low Autonomy  
 
(High Variety) 
 
“Things move very fast. You just have to be on your toes all the time. Junior personnel 
have to pick up lots of different skills real fast. If not, we slow down the rest of the team. 
Deadlines come and go really quickly so it’s a huge challenge to manage your own time 
efficiently.” 
 
Dave J 
 
“We work in a situation where everyone gets a chance to play various roles in the team. I 
think the focus here is on getting people to be proficient in all areas of the business.” 
 
Paul S 
 
“There are lots of things we learn here that are not taught in school. There is the practical 
stuff like learning to work with people from very different functional backgrounds. And 
there is the technical stuff like learning to run prediction models for specific industries.” 
 
Ryan G 
 
(Moderate Security) 
 
“I feel that the company makes a decent effort to make people feel as though their jobs are 
safe. But more can still be done.” 
 
Ben K 
 
“I don’t feel as if my job is in danger, even though occasionally people can be asked to 
leave over petty issues.” 
 
Fran H 
 
“The company operates soundly in a moderately stable industry. We have a mix of people 
who have been here for a long time and those to stay only for a few years. 
 
Casey L 
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(Moderate Span of Control) 
 
“Sometimes I am put in a position where I have to supervise the work of others I work 
with. I see these times as opportunities to develop my leadership potential.” 
 
          May Q 
 
“My responsibilities occasionally include supervising a group of co-workers. At other 
times, I am pretty much responsible for my own deliverables.” 
 
          Rich T 
 
“I have a few people report to me infrequently. Part of my job involves making sure my 
subordinates are carrying out their duties properly. However, they are able to take care of 
themselves at most times.” 
 
           Bud F 
(Moderate Altruism) 
 
“I get some opportunities to contribute to those who are needy in my job. They don’t come 
by very often, but at least they are something to look forward to” 
   
Harry J 
 
“We work quite closely with each other in teams. Which means sometimes you have to 
help each other out. However, this does not mean that you neglect your own 
responsibilities. ” 
         
Trey B 
 
“The environment here is rather community-based. At times, you see people assisting 
coworkers in their work and family. Then again some aspects of the job can cause you to be 
quite self-centered.” 
 
Ronnie W 
 
(Low Autonomy) 
 
“People in my position don’t really get a huge say in about how things are run over here. I 
just do what my boss tells me to do.” 
 
          Gerry H 
 
“The company seems pretty rigid in its procedures. We are encouraged to keep our heads 
down and follow the rules to a T.” 
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   Ram J 
 
“Every time I try to implement changes in the way my job is performed, I am met with lot 
of resistance from the management. This makes me feel powerless over how things are 
done over here.”  
 
Evan T 
 
Version 2: Moderate Variety, Low Span of Control, High Autonomy 
 
(Moderate Variety) 
 
“I feel that I had some opportunities to learn new and different things. That being said, it is 
a quite a huge corporation so sometimes you have to specialize in certain areas.” 
 
           Matt B 
 
“The company does make an effort at times to rotate people across different job functions. 
However, this is very much dependent on where opportunities come up in different 
departments. Sometimes when things are slow, you can end up doing the same thing for 
months.” 
 
Lamar R 
 
“Sometimes I get the opportunity to apprentice under several different managers at one 
time. It helps minimize the monotony of doing the same thing over and over again.” 
 
Marcel T 
  
(Moderate Security) 
 
“My job is quite essential to the overall business model of the company, so they make a 
decent effort to keep us happy and satisfied despite the uncertain business climate.” 
 
     Taylor W 
 
“I don’t see things changing much around here in the short to medium term. Most of us are 
fairly certain we will be with the company for the next few years at least.” 
 
          Drew Q  
 
“I feel moderately secure in this job. People come and go quite often, but at least I can get 
on with my work without having to worry much about whether I’ll be laid off.” 
 
          Ina S 
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(Low Span of Control) 
 
“It’s a very democratic system here. Even people at our level don’t really supervise the 
work of people working under us.” 
 
Wang L. 
 
“The place has a flat hierarchy where supervisors lead by merely facilitating and making 
sure everyone has what he or she needs to get the work done.” 
 
Judy D 
 
“We work around in dispersed teams that are constantly changing. As such, there are no 
real chances to manage or be in charge of people.” 
 
Tamika J 
(Moderate Altruism) 
 
 “Our strong ties with the local community allow us to engage in pro-bono work from time 
to time. Nevertheless we still look out for our own economic interests.”  
 
Jeff E 
 
“My job sometimes requires me to get involved in charitable work. Though, this only 
happens when we are in-between assignments.”  
 
Len S 
 
“Some people here see it as one of their missions to add to the well-being of other people. 
However, several others are clearly only in it for the money.” 
 
Kym G 
 
(High Autonomy) 
 
“I have a lot of latitude to decide how I do my work. This is the place for people who can 
work under very little structure and guidance.” 
 
          Troy G 
 
“We have a very open decision-making process. I can determine how I choose to complete 
my tasks without having to seek permission from my supervisors.” 
 
        Tran V 
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“My input on how I would like to see my work done is really valued. More often than not, I 
end up being in charge of my own work processes and deliverables.” 
 
           Ray T 
 
Version 3: Low Variety, High Span of Control, Moderate Autonomy 
 
(Low Variety) 
“We really emphasize being good at what we do. People around here are encouraged to 
concentrate on developing their expertise in a few core products.” 
 
           Jenn Y 
 
“I have been assigned to the same project for 9 months. At times it is difficult not feel 
bored doing the same thing over and over again.” 
 
           Pat G 
 
“The learning curve is quite steep at the beginning. You are expected to pick things up fast. 
After that, things become quite routine day in day out.” 
 
          Kathy P 
 
(Moderate Security) 
“Though things can be quite unpredictable here, we all feel that our jobs are relatively 
secure.” 
  
Duane J  
 
“People are let go rather often in this job. However, even with the speed of changes 
nowadays, I am reasonably confident that I’ll still be in this job five years from now.” 
 
 Mary T 
 
“There are conflicting views about the long term prospects of this job. Some here think that 
their jobs will last forever. While others feel that we are only a year or so away from being 
retrenched.” 
 
Kasey R 
 
(High Span of Control) 
“We have a well-established hierarchy that supports our business model. You probably 
would have several people reporting to you at one time.” 
 
          Kris T 
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“Good leaders are valued around here. Since you will be leading a group of subordinates 
most of the time, you have to be comfortable being in-charge of people.” 
 
          Danny F  
 
“There are many opportunities to develop your leadership potential here. Management here 
really looks out for people who can manage their subordinates effectively.” 
 
          Craig H 
 
(Moderate Altruism) 
“In this job, it is quite fair to say that you should subscribe to the view that helping others is 
as important as helping yourself.” 
            
Ray B 
 
“I occasionally see people go out of their own way to assist those who require some help 
just to get by. I wish there would be more of such people around here.” 
 
Hanley R 
 
“This place gives me a decent amount of opportunities to carry out my passion of working 
with the disadvantaged. However, being charitable is hard considering that we also have to 
maintain a profitable business.” 
 
Abe K 
 
(Moderate Autonomy) 
“My boss gives me some leeway to decide how my work gets done.” 
 
        Lance R 
 
“For people in my position, I would say that there are a decent amount of opportunities to 
have our input to the way things are run over at our level.” 
 
          Becky H 
 
“I am glad that from time to time I am able to structure my work in a way so that it suits me 
and my working style. I just have to make sure I stay in line with the generally accepted 
guidelines.” 
 
Holly T 
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Appendix B: 
 
Items Used to Measure Job Facets 
 
Question stem: 
How much is present in this job?  
How much would you like? 
 
Autonomy 
Doing my work in your own way. 
 Determining the way your work is done. 
 Being able to make your own decisions. 
 
Span of Control  
 Having subordinates report to you. 
 Being in charge of people. 
 Having people report to you as their boss. 
 
Variety  
Doing a variety of things. 
Doing something different every day. 
  Doing many different things on the job.
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